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STRATEGIC PRICE COMPETITION AND PRICE DISPERION IN THE 
AIRLINE INDUSTRY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
EDWARD D. GAILEY 
 
ABSTRACT 
It is a generally accepted belief in marketing literature that variation in prices, 
i.e. price dispersion, is a critical, strategic factor that influences product demand, 
profitability, and social welfare.  While there is a substantial amount of research 
on price dispersion, prior research has mainly studied price dispersion in the 
context of consumer heterogeneity, and not comprehensively studied the effects 
of competition on price dispersion.  According to the structure-conduct-
performance (SCP) paradigm, market structure and firm conduct are important 
indicators of firm performance and long-term sustainable competitive 
advantage.   
A greater understanding of the influences of market structure and 
competition on price dispersion provides valuable insights and extends the 
stream of research on price dispersion.  Therefore, the main objective of this 
dissertation is to increase the understanding of the effects of strategic price 
competition on price dispersion.  Specifically, this research encompasses an 
evaluation of the effects of strategic price competition in a multi-market context 
on price dispersion by focusing on market and competition characteristics.  The 
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effects of strategic price competition on price dispersion of airline ticket prices 
are empirically evaluated based on an extensive database from the U.S. 
Department of Transportation.  The results of this study show that multi-market 
contact between rival firms and the interaction of multi-market contact and 
market concentration have a significant effect on price dispersion.  These results 
have important academic and managerial implications.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vii 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT………………….....………………………………………………v 
LIST OF TABLES….....………...….……………………………...……….….x 
LIST OF FIGURES….....…………………………………………..………….xi 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………..1 
Relevance of Price Dispersion to Marketing.…..………….…….…….6 
Price Dispersion in Traditional and Internet Markets……….…….6 
Price Dispersion in Airline Markets…………………………...….7 
Sources of Price Dispersion………………………………..…………..9 
Consumer Heterogeneity…………………………….…………..10 
Consumer Search Costs………………………..….……………..12 
Competition…………………………………….………………..13 
Strategic Price Competition…………………………………………..16 
Multi-Market Contact…………….………….…………………..18 
Strategic Similarity……………………..………………………..19 
Objective of this Research……………..……………………………..20 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW…………..……..…..…………….………….22 
Price Dispersion…………..……..…………..…………….………….22 
Sources of Price Dispersion………………………….….……….23 
Selected Marketing Research on Price Dispersion..….………….28 
Price Dispersion in the Airline Industry………………….….……….34 
Economic Perspective……………………………..…………….34 
 viii 
 
 
Revenue Management‟s Influence on Price Dispersion……....…38 
Strategic Price Competition……………..………………….….……..40 
Multi-Market Contact……………..…………….…….…..……..41 
Strategic Similarity……………..………………………………..42 
Market concentration……………..………..….…….…………..43 
III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.....………………….…………..…..45 
Price Dispersion – Theoretical Background……..….……………..…49 
Theories Related to Price Dispersion………………..…..………50 
Competition, Market Characteristics, and Price Dispersion….….….53 
Multi-Market Contact……………………………...………....…55 
Strategic Similarity……..……………………….………………58 
Market Concentration within a Local Market……….…….….…61 
Market Size……..………………………………………….……63 
Route Distance……………………………….………….………65 
Hub Airport…………………………………….………..………66 
Multi-Market Contact and Strategic Similarity Interaction….….68 
Multi-Market Contact and Market Concentration Interaction..…71 
Strategic Similarity and Market Concentration Interaction….….72 
IV. METHODOLOGY & DATA....…..…………….…..………………..74 
U.S. Airline Industry……..……………………………………..……74 
Data Description……………………………………..…………….…75 
Method – Multiple Regression………………………………..………76 
Multicollinearity and Multiple Regression…………………...………79 
 ix 
 
 
Empirical Model…………………….………..……..………..………81 
Dependent Variable - Price Dispersion….………….………...………83 
Independent Variables……………….………………….….....………88 
V. ANALYSIS & RESULTS.………………….………………………… 94 
Revised Price Dispersion Framework…………………….……….…99 
Descriptive Statistics…………………..…………………….………101 
Estimation Results………………..……………………..…..………103 
VI. IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, & CONCLUSION……………..116 
Academic Implications…………………………….………..………116 
Managerial Implications………..…….……………………..………119
 Limitations…………………..……..………………………..………123 
Future Research Directions…….….………………………..………124 
Conclusion……………………..…………..…………………..……125 
REFERENCES………………………………………………………..………128 
APPENDICES………………………………………………….……..………135 
A.  Selected Research on Sources of Price Dispersion……..……..…..…136 
B.  Selected Literature Related to Price Dispersion…………………...…139 
C.  Model Comparison…………………………………………….…..…145 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 
I.   Variable Measurement and Data Summary.…………..…..….…….……..82 
II.   Correlation Matrix.…………………………..……..…..….….…………..95 
III.   Holdout Sample Evaluation………………………..……………….……..97 
IV.  Descriptive Statistics.……………….………..………..…….…………..101 
V.   Data Statistics.…………..……………………….…….…….…………..102 
VI.  Regression Results.………………………..……….…..………….……..103 
VII.  Multi-Market Contact & Concentration Interaction (H8)…….……..…..112 
VIII. Comparison of Results……………………………………………..……114 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xi 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 
1.  Price Dispersion Framework………………………….…..……………….48 
2.   Graphical Representation of H7……………………..……………..………70 
3.   Graphical Representation of H8………………………..….…….…………71 
4.   Graphical Representation of H9…………………………...….……………73 
5.   Gini Coefficient Example…………………..………….….….……………86 
6. Revised Price Dispersion Framework………………….………………...101 
7.   Interaction of Multi-Market Contact and Market Concentration (H8)…...113
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
Variation in prices, i.e. price dispersion, is a critical, strategic factor that 
influences product demand and social welfare.  Price dispersion is typically 
defined as the variation in prices of homogeneous products sold by competing 
firms (Stigler 1961; Borenstein and Rose 1994; Sorensen 2000; Zhao 2006).  
Price dispersion is also explained as the distribution of prices of an item with the 
same measured characteristics across sellers in a specific time period (Pan, 
Ratchford, and Shankar 2004).   
Price dispersion was first described in Stigler‟s (1961) seminal article on the 
economics of information.  Since then, price dispersions of a wide range of 
products have been studied by economic researchers and in the last decade by 
marketing researchers.  Some of the products studied include music CDs, books 
(including textbooks), consumer electronics, cameras, computers (both desktop 
and laptop), software, keyboards, scanners, PDAs, refrigerators, grocery items, 
flowers, gasoline, coffee, prescription drugs, automobiles, mortgage interest 
rates, and airline tickets (Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar 2004; Baye, Morgan, and 
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Scholten 2006).  Some of the price dispersion studies by economists evaluated 
the effects on society (e.g., social welfare), as well. 
From an economic perspective, price levels are a particularly useful 
measure of market efficiency.  Within the classic economic model of social 
welfare, setting a single price above the theoretical equilibrium price causes 
some consumers to forego socially efficient exchanges.  As a result, firms lose 
the opportunity to receive the sales revenue from those exchanges.  Therefore, 
variation in prices leads to an increase in social welfare as more welfare-
enhancing exchanges are allowed to occur (Rob 1985; Borenstein and Rose 
1994; Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000).  When considering the economic 
perspective, one also needs to consider the structure of the industry and 
characteristics of the firms competing within the markets.   
The purpose of this study is to expand the understanding of how 
competition influences price dispersion.  Prior research has not comprehensively 
studied the effects of competition on price dispersion.  The effects on price 
dispersion of some important aspects of competition, such as the number of 
competitors in a market and market concentration have been studied (e.g., 
Borenstein and Rose 1994).  However, the degree to which competitors compete 
in different markets, referred to as multi-market contact, and strategic similarity 
between different types of competing firms affect price dispersion have not been 
studied.   This current research expands the growing field of research by 
including these new, important variables and providing a conceptual framework. 
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Most modern markets are not purely competitive markets, where 
competition is fierce due to many firms selling similar products and many 
buyers with „perfect‟ product information.  It is much more common to find 
markets where oligopolisitic competition occurs due to there being a few, large 
firms and buyers with less than perfect product information, especially price.  
Although the product can be homogenous in either type of market conditions, 
the limited number of firms in the oligopoly provides the firms selling the 
products far more influence over determining market prices.   
Oligopoly theory is concerned with the relationships between the few, large 
firms in an oligopoly market (Ulph 1987).  The firms recognize their 
interdependency and may act in a coordinated manner affecting prices and 
competitive strategy.  According to oligopoly theory, collusion, either tacit or 
purposive, among the firms may occur because firms recognize their mutual 
dependence (Baum and Korn 1996).   
Oligopolistic competition is common in service industries with a small 
number of large firms with high fixed costs, such as airlines, hotels, 
entertainment companies, and energy firms.  Mookherjee and Rigdon (2005) 
describe this oligopolistic setting in which the firms each have an objective to 
maximize revenue.  They suggest that customers typically see the service 
provided to be homogenous.  Oligopolistic competition among service providers 
with fixed capacity lends itself to revenue management, where the price is 
adjusted (resulting in price dispersion) to maximize demand and revenue.  
Research findings on factors that influence price dispersion and that are 
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divergent from perfect competition have lead to further research focused on 
market conditions, such as competition.   
Price dispersion in the airline industry has been selected for this study 
because airline tickets are homogenous and fully describable (e.g., city-pair 
routes and the number of passengers).  The market for airline tickets is 
interesting to evaluate in relation to competition because of the aggressive, 
competitive behavior demonstrated by the airlines (e.g., price wars) and the 
variability of competitive contact within and across local markets.   
The results of this study may be generalizable to other service industries 
with similar characteristics.  The results can provide major benefits to future 
research but it is important to stress that when applying the results of this study, 
future researchers need to be careful that the characteristics of the industry or 
market being studied has similar characteristics to the airline industry.  Key 
characteristics that affect the results are; the level of multi-market contact, the 
presence of multiple identifiable differences in strategies, and of course, the 
perishable nature of the service product.   
Extensive research has shown that markets for many homogeneous products 
are characterized by considerable price dispersion (e.g., Stigler 1961; Salop and 
Stiglitz 1982; Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar 2004; Baye, Morgan, and Scholten 
2006).  There is an emerging stream of research that suggests that specific types 
of market imperfections influence price dispersion, such as customer learning 
(Johnson et al, 2000) brand loyalty (Chen and Hitt 2001), and systematic 
variations in the nature of products offered over the Internet versus traditional  
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channels (Lee 1998).  Understanding the presence or absence of exploitable 
imperfections in markets and their implications for pricing strategy is critical for 
the long-term viability not only for retailers, but also firms that must compete in 
environments with increasingly informed customers (Clemons, Hann, and Hitt 
2002).  This current study examines the airline ticket market, which has 
increasingly informed customers, for the purpose of seeking greater 
understanding of competitive forces on price dispersion.  
This study contributes to this stream of research by: 1. providing a 
conceptual framework on the variables affecting price dispersion in a complex, 
service product (i.e., airline ticket) market, 2. examining the influence of two 
important, new variables; multi-market contact and strategic similarity, 3. 
presenting an empirical-based evaluation of price dispersion and influencing 
factors, and 4. contributing insight to managers working in these types of service 
industries.  The effects of multi-market contact and strategic similarity on price 
dispersion have not been studied.   This current research expands the growing 
field of research by including these new, important variables and providing a 
conceptual framework.  This study investigates how these competition-related 
variables along with market concentration affects price dispersion of airline 
ticket prices.  
In the rest of this chapter, price dispersion is discussed in greater detail, 
covering the relevance of price dispersion to marketing, sources of price 
dispersion, strategic price competition and the purpose of this study.   
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Relevance of Price Dispersion to Marketing 
Price dispersion is influential from the viewpoint of consumers, sellers, and the 
market in general (Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar 2004).  For consumers, price 
dispersion characterizes the alternative product offerings in the market and 
affects search activities and purchase behavior.  As a result, price dispersion 
influences demand for products.  For sellers, it reflects the pricing strategy of 
competitors and their coordinated actions.  For the market as a whole, it is a 
central measure of information efficiency.  Price dispersion influences the 
actions taken by sellers and consumers within a market and affects market 
efficiency. 
Price dispersion is important in marketing because it has been demonstrated 
to affect many of the factors that influence consumer demand.  As an example, 
Burman and Biswas (2004) demonstrated the potential of price dispersion in 
strengthening the impact of implausible reference prices on consumer 
evaluations.  Burman and Biswas (p. 387) state that “…marketers must be wary 
of the fact that if consumers perceive the reference price as very high, which is 
more likely to happen for a product with narrow price dispersion in the market, 
chances of reference pricing not being effective also will be high”.  
Price Dispersion in Traditional and Internet Markets 
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) compared price dispersion between Internet and 
traditional retailers for two categories of homogeneous products; books and 
CDs.  Their study produced several key findings with regard to price dispersion.  
First, prices on the Internet were 9-16% lower than prices in traditional outlets, 
depending on whether taxes, shipping and shopping costs are included in the 
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price.  Second, they found that Internet retailers‟ price adjustments were up to 
100 times smaller than traditional retailers‟ price adjustments; reflecting lower 
menu costs in Internet channels.  Third, levels of price dispersion depend on the 
measures employed.  The prices posted by different Internet retailers exhibited 
substantial dispersion.  Internet retailer prices differ by an average of 33% for 
books and 25% for CDs.  However, when weighting these prices by proxies for 
market share, Brynjolfsson and Smith found that dispersion is lower in Internet 
channels than in traditional channels, reflecting dominance of certain heavily 
branded retailers. 
Biswas, Dutta, and Pullig (2006) studied the moderating role of perceived 
price dispersion on low price guarantees.  Price dispersion was evaluated as a 
signal for lowest price in a retail environment using mock ads for a branded 
DVD player.  The results show that price guarantee effects are attenuated when 
consumers perceive price dispersion to be high for a given product.  The results 
also indicate that a low price guarantee with progressively higher levels of 
penalty leads to incrementally more favorable effects on key consumer 
outcomes when perceived price dispersion is high.  The effect of increasing the 
penalty level had no such incremental benefit on consumer outcomes in the 
situation of low perceived price dispersion.   
Price Dispersion in Airline Markets 
The airline industry is a traditional market, but it is being influenced by the 
Internet due to online ticket price comparison services and ticket selling.  Price 
dispersion in service industries (e.g., airlines) is pervasive and the effect of 
strategic price competition on price dispersion is not well understood.  Variation 
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of prices even occurs in markets that seem particularly conducive to economic 
competition, such as the airline ticket market (Sorensen 2000).  Many people 
have experienced price variations in airline tickets for the same route, even the 
same airline and same ticket characteristics (e.g., seating class, departure and 
arrival times).  The wide range of airline ticket pricing for the same route is a 
prime example of price dispersion.   
Price dispersion of airline ticket prices has been studied from different 
perspectives by Borenstein and Rose (1994), Dana (1999), and Clemens, Hann, 
and Hitt (2002).  Borenstein and Rose (1994) studied airline ticket prices of 
eleven major U.S. airlines.  The strongest and most striking finding was the 
significant effect of competition on price dispersion.  Price dispersion increased 
on routes with more competition.  Dana (1999) extended Prescott‟s (1975) 
model to monopoly and imperfect competition.  Dana shows that the model 
predicts equilibrium with intra-firm price dispersion in which each firm offers 
its output at multiple prices (as opposed to random prices).  As competition 
increases, the average price level falls and the degree of price dispersion 
increases.  Clemens, Hann, and Hitt examined the presence of price dispersion 
in the airline ticket offerings of online travel agents (OTAs).  They found that 
different OTAs offer tickets with substantially different prices and 
characteristics when the OTAs were given the same customer request.  After 
accounting for the differences in ticket characteristics, there was considerable 
price dispersion.   
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Some of this variation appeared to be due to product differentiation, i.e., 
different OTAs specialize by systematically offering different trade-offs 
between ticket price and ticket quality (minimizing the number of connections, 
matching requested departure, and return time).  However, even after accounting 
for differences in ticket quality, ticket prices varied (i.e., price dispersion) by 
18% across OTAs.   
 
 
Sources of Price Dispersion 
Researchers have investigated and identified a number of potential sources of 
price dispersion.  Three major sources of price dispersion are: (1) consumer 
heterogeneity (e.g., education, income), (2) consumer search costs, and (3) 
competition (including market structure factors, such as market concentration 
and market share) (Borenstein and Rose 1994; Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar 
2003; Zhao 2006).  Appendix 1 describes some of the research related to each of 
these three sources of price dispersion.   
 Zhao‟s (2006) study evaluated these three important sources of price 
dispersion and demonstrated that price dispersion of grocery products is 
positively correlated with greater consumer heterogeneity, higher consumer 
search costs, and more intense competition.  Zhao‟s exploratory research studied 
the various degrees of price dispersion in supermarkets and checked for 
consistency with the existing theories of price dispersion due to consumer search 
costs, consumer heterogeneity, and competition.  Zhao found price dispersion to  
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be positively correlated with consumer search costs, consumer heterogeneity, 
and competition, which is consistent with generally accepted theory.   
As appendix 1 shows, researchers have examined the influence of consumer 
heterogeneity on price dispersion from various aspects.  Some of the aspects of 
consumer heterogeneity that have been evaluated are: differences in consumers 
perceptions of price dispersion, demographics, value perceptions, shopping 
intention, time sensitivity, price sensitivity, willingness to pay for attributes, and 
types of consumers (e.g., business or personal, informed or uniformed).  There is 
overlap between consumer heterogeneity and consumer search costs.  One 
aspect of consumer heterogeneity is the differences in the cost of search for 
consumers.  However, there are numerous other aspects of consumer 
heterogeneity as mentioned above.  While all three major sources have been 
studied, research on competition‟s influence on price dispersion has been 
limited.  Next, these three sources of price dispersion are discussed.   
Consumer Heterogeneity 
Consumer heterogeneity, the diverseness of consumer preferences, affects price 
dispersion in several ways.  Firms are able to exercise price discrimination based 
on differences among consumers‟ price elasticities, preferences, or willingness 
to pay for quality or product offering variations.  A seller‟s motivation for price 
discrimination is likely to increase with the variation of attributes in the 
population that reflect buyers‟ price elasticities or preferences (Shepard 1991).   
Shepard (1991), Burman and Biswas (2004), and Biswas, Dutta, and Pullig 
(2006) represent a few of the important studies on the relationship between 
consumer heterogeneity and price dispersion.  Shepard (1991) evaluated retail 
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gasoline prices.  She developed a test that discriminates between price structures 
associated with price discrimination and with cost-driven, competitive 
differentials.  A second test applied by Sheppard was based on profitability 
variations and rejected a competitive, peak-load pricing explanation for the 
observed price dispersion.  Shepard showed that price dispersion can occur in 
multi-firm markets due to price discrimination when consumer heterogeneity 
exists related to differences in consumers‟ willingness to pay. 
Burman and Biswas (2004) examined the moderating role price dispersion 
for a product category in influencing consumer evaluation of reference prices.  
Reference prices are the price that buyers use to evaluate an offered price 
(Monroe 2003).   A reference price may be in the consumers‟ memory or the 
price of an alternative product.  Consumer heterogeneity was evaluated on the 
basis of differences in consumers‟ value perceptions and shopping intentions.  
Burman and Biswas‟s study demonstrated the potential of price dispersion in 
strengthening the impact of implausible reference prices on consumer 
evaluations.  Findings show that when price dispersion is narrow, the 
consumer‟s reference price is more likely to be high, thereby reducing the 
effectiveness of reference pricing.  
Biswas, Dutta, and Pullig (2006) studied the moderating effect of price 
dispersion on consumers‟ pre-purchase evaluations of low price guarantees and 
purchase behavioral intentions.  Consumer heterogeneity was evaluated on the 
basis of differences in perceived price dispersion.  Their study showed that when  
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price dispersion is perceived by consumers to be high, low price guarantee 
effects are attenuated.   
The following topic, consumer search costs, is related to consumer 
heterogeneity, in some circumstances.  A few of the effects of consumer search 
costs are related to consumer characteristics.  For instance, some consumers are 
more able (e.g., level of literacy) to search for product information or have a 
greater interest in collecting product information (e.g., people who enjoy 
shopping in the interest of finding bargains). 
Consumer Search Costs 
As stated by Rob (1985), when a consumer‟s perceived search costs (time, lost 
opportunities, etc.) exceed the anticipated price reduction, the consumer will 
stop searching for lower prices.  The effect of consumer search costs on price 
dispersion has been evaluated by a numerous researchers (e.g., Stigler 1961; 
Salop and Stiglitz 1977, 1982; Varian 1980; Rob 1985; Zhao 2006).  Literature 
indicates that price dispersion can persist in markets where there is imperfect 
information and consumers incur search costs to obtain price information.  As 
consumers incur search costs to get information, some consumers engage in 
price searching and others make purchases randomly.  Therefore, sellers are able 
to charge different prices, and price dispersion develops in the market.    
Stigler (1961) coined the term „consumer search‟ and initiated a study of the 
subject.  He advocated that advertising is a key factor in reducing consumer 
search costs.  Stigler argued that reducing search costs should reduce price 
dispersion and therefore, the advertising of prices should reduce price 
dispersion.  Salop and Stiglitz (1977) analyzed the industry equilibrium for an 
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economy in which imperfectly informed consumers can only become perfectly 
informed at a cost.  Their theoretical evaluation was based on a durable 
commodity and led to a monopolistically competitive equilibrium and price 
dispersion.  Salop and Stiglitz (1982) showed that price dispersion could also 
result from consumers with heterogeneous search costs, if there are a large 
number of consumers with zero search costs.   
The heterogeneous search costs of consumers can also cause price 
dispersion over time for a specific product (Varian 1980).  Varian provides a 
theoretical explanation of motivation for stores to randomize prices in an 
attempt to price discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers, who 
have different levels of search costs and opportunity costs.  Rob (1985) 
evaluated search costs for a model with a variety of stores and consumers.  
Rob‟s theoretical analysis demonstrates how price dispersion can persist in a 
stable market with imperfect information.   
Zhao (2006) studied sources of price dispersion in the grocery market.  He 
focused on three conditions: across stores, across UPCs (universal product code) 
within a product category, and overtime for a certain brand.  Zhao‟s study found 
support for the positive correlation between search costs and price dispersion for 
all three conditions.  A number of research studies, including Zhao‟s (2006) 
study, have also evaluated competition as major influence on price dispersion 
and are now discussed.    
Competition 
Research has shown that competition among firms affects price dispersion.  
Theory predicts that price dispersion among sellers should decrease with 
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increased competition, if industry elasticities are the more prevalent basis for 
segregation (monopoly-type discrimination), and it should increase with 
increased competition, if heterogeneity in cross elasticity is the more common 
source of discrimination (competitive-type discrimination) (Borenstein 1985; 
Holmes 1989).   
There is some empirical evidence suggesting that price dispersion is an 
outcome of competition, for example, in the U.S. airline industry (Borenstein 
and Rose 1994) and in the Irish grocery market (Walsh and Whelan 1999).  
Borenstein and Rose found that competition has a strong, positive effect on price 
dispersion.  With regard to market characteristics, price dispersion is affected by 
the characteristics of competition within specific markets as well as across 
markets.   
Walsh and Whelan utilized the methodology developed by Borenstein and 
Rose and confirmed that „competitive type‟ pricing among brands of grocery 
items affects price dispersion.  Their results suggest that brand pricing tactics 
across consumer segments induce varying degrees of localized imperfect price 
competition.  This finding provides evidence that limited consumer brand 
switching abilities become relatively more elastic in some consumer segments 
compared to other consumer segments in response to competitive forces.   
As competition across firms increases, firms may choose to be more 
vertically differentiated (i.e., based on perceived quality differences) from each 
other to relax the price competition (Iyer 1998).  If firms were positioned too 
close to each other, then consumers would choose among them on the basis of  
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price, which would create the incentive to compete on price, and the net result 
would be lower profits for all the firms (Moorthy 1988).  Firms may choose to 
be differentiated on dimensions, such as services and product assortment to 
soften price competition.  Price dispersion for the same product across firms 
may increase as firm competition increases and as firms are more vertically 
differentiated from one another because of the competition.   
Understanding the causes of price dispersion among a wide range of 
products is a challenge to marketing and economic researchers.  The purpose of 
this study is to provide greater understanding of the causes of price dispersion 
that are related to competition and strategy.  How does competition among rival 
firms within and across markets affect the degree of price dispersion in markets?   
How do the firms‟ strategies affect price dispersion in markets?   How 
significant are the effects of competition-based and strategy-based variables on 
price dispersion?  Recent research has identified competition and strategy as 
factors the influence price dispersion without much investigation of the 
underlying causes.  The intention of this study is to provide information to fill 
this gap in price dispersion research.  In the following section, strategic price 
competition and a few of the key variables that affect strategic price competition 
are discussed. 
This study focuses on the causes of price dispersion that emanate from the 
third source, competition, but from a more comprehensive perspective.  In a 
competitive environment, variables that have been found to affect price 
dispersion include market concentration, market share, market density, and the  
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number of competitors in the market.  A major gap in the research related to 
competition‟s effect on price dispersion is the influence that contact in other 
markets and differences in rivals‟ strategies have on pricing.   
 
Strategic Price Competition 
Strategic price competition in multiple markets has been shown to affect price 
dispersion.  Strategic price competition ensues when the competing firms 
employ different pricing tactics based on their overall competitive strategies.  
For example, research has shown that entry of a limited-service, low-fare 
competitor may affect the price levels and relative profits of full-service, high-
fare incumbents (Chintagunta and Desiraju 2005).  Research on multi-market 
competition indicates that the complexity of pricing strategy increases as firms 
compete in several markets.  Price dispersion may reflect the level of 
competition within an airport (Ancarani and Shankar 2004). 
Even though there is a growing body of research on multi-market 
competition, there is no integrated framework to help explain its influence on 
price dispersion.  This study develops an integrated, conceptual framework 
based on an evaluation of the effects of strategic price competition on price 
dispersion in a multi-market context.  The effects of strategic price competition 
on price dispersion of airline ticket prices are empirically evaluated based on an 
extensive database of the Department of Transportation (DOT) from the first 
quarter of 1999.   
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Developing a multi-market strategy in the presence of strategic price 
competition emphasizes the importance of considering inter-firm relations 
within and across-markets and strategic price competition‟s influence on price 
dispersion.  Recent marketing research has emphasized the importance of price 
dispersion as a key strategic variable that is applied by firms to influence 
demand for their products.  Increasing the understanding of the effects of key 
variables of service industries (e.g., the airline industry) is very important and 
useful to marketing researchers and marketing practitioners in order that they 
may be better able to positively influence the financial performance of these 
firms.  
Strategic price competition has a major impact on the economic 
performance of the airline industry (Rubin and Joy 2005).  Chintagunta and 
Desiraju (2005) studied strategic price competition and focused on three 
determinants of price levels effect across geographic markets; within market 
response to each variable, the nature of inter-firm relations, both within the 
market and across markets.  The authors argue that when determining its 
marketing mix, a firm needs to consider the following three issues: (1) the role 
of within-market strategic coordination among the firms in any given geographic 
market, (2) the role of across-market strategic exchanges when the same firms 
compete with each other in several distinct markets, and (3) heterogeneity of 
aggregate market response across markets.  This study evaluates similar effects 
on the domestic airline industry and the markets served. 
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There are two additional key constructs that have not been applied to price 
dispersion that may provide important insight into the strategic influences of 
strategic pricing; multi-market contact and strategic similarity.  Multi-market 
contact is the contact a firm has with rival firms (in a focal market) in other 
markets (Karnani and Wernerfelt 1985; Baum and Korn 1996).  Multi-market 
contact indicates the level of competition among firms within specific markets.  
Strategic similarity is the degree of similarity of the overall strategic plans (i.e., 
independent of the specific market served by the firm) of competing firms 
(Gimeno and Woo 1996; Fuentelsaz and Gomez 2006).   
Multi-Market Contact 
Multi-market contact measures the potential for contacts among competing 
firms in multiple markets (Karnani and Wernerfelt 1985; Baum and Korn 1996). 
These contacts affect the level of competition among firms within specific 
markets.  Multi-market contact (sometimes referred to as multipoint 
competition, Fuentelsaz and Gomez 2006) influences the potential for mutual 
forbearance at the firm-market level (i.e., one market in a firm‟s market 
domain).  Mutual forbearance is the tempering of aggressiveness that occurs as 
the degree of multi-market contact among firms in a given market increases 
(Edwards 1955).  This tempering of aggressiveness occurs due to the possibility 
of multi-market retaliation.   
Theories of inter-firm competition agree that, in general, the greater the 
overlap between a firm‟s market domain and the market domains of other firms, 
the greater the intensity of competition the focal firm experiences (Hannan and 
Freeman 1977, 1989; Porter 1980; Scherer and Ross 1990; Tirole 1988).  
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However, firms with high market domain overlap frequently encounter each 
other simultaneously in multiple markets.  As an example, airlines frequently 
compete for customers on multiple routes.  Mutual forbearance theory implies 
that rivalry will be less among multi-market competitors. As a result, firms that 
are close competitors may not be intense rivals (Baum and Korn 1996).   
Strategic Similarity 
Strategic similarity is the degree of similarity of the strategies of competing 
firms independent of the specific market served by the firm (Gimeno and Woo 
1996; Fuentelsaz and Gomez 2006).  In the case of this study, two considerably 
different strategies are considered; full-service, high-fare (e.g., American 
Airlines) and limited-service, low-fare (e.g., Southwest Airlines).  Caves and 
Porter (1977) argue that the structural similarity among firms (e.g., R&D, 
advertising, cost structures) may lead these firms to closely recognize their 
interdependences and anticipate the moves of rivals accurately, making tacit 
collusion easier.  Recent research has offered further evidence in favor of 
collusive behavior (Young, Smith, Grimm, and Simon 2000; Peteraf 1993a).  
However, the hypothesis that more similar firms experience less rivalry has been 
challenged.   
Cool and Dierickx (1993) argue that it is not clear why rivalry among 
strategically similar firms should be less intense than competition coming from 
other firms.  Although strategically similar firms tend to recognize more closely 
their interdependencies, the existence of these groups of firms could also help to 
identify the set of rivals more capable of negatively affecting performance 
should tacit cooperation break (Fuentelsaz and Gomez 2006).  Firms with 
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similar strategies would likely have similar underlying resource endowments 
that could be used more effectively to face aggressive rivals (Peteraf 1993b; 
Gimeno and Woo 1996). 
 
 
Objective of this Research 
The purpose of this study is to expand the understanding of effects of strategic 
price competition on price dispersion.  The following research questions are 
addressed by this study.   
1. How does multi-market contact affect price dispersion?  Research on multi-
market contact indicates that at some level of multi-market contact‟s affect 
on rivalry intensity is mixed and therefore the effect on price dispersion is 
mixed.  It is also possible that multi-market contact‟s affect on that price 
dispersion may be an inverted-U relationship.   
2. How does strategic similarity of rival firms affect price dispersion?  
Research indicates that firms with similar strategies are more likely to have 
more similar pricing (i.e., less price dispersion than firms with dissimilar 
strategies. 
3. How does market concentration within local markets affect price 
dispersion?  Market concentration can be evaluated at various market levels.  
Research indicates that within local markets, as market concentration 
increase, price dispersion will decrease, as few firms have larger market 
shares. 
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4. How does a firm‟s dominance within a market affect price dispersion?  In 
the context of the airline industry this is related to whether the firm is 
operating in a hub or non-hub airport.  The level of dominance in the 
national market of the hub airline may also affect price dispersion.   
 
To accomplish these objectives, this study evaluated the data to find 
answers to the research questions.  The rest of this paper is organized into the 
following chapters.  In Chapter 2, prior research on price dispersion and the key 
constructs (multi-market contact and strategic similarity) is reviewed.  In 
Chapter 3, the conceptual framework and the development of the hypotheses are 
presented and explained.  In Chapter 4, the methodology that is applied in the 
analysis and the data set are described.  In Chapter 5, the results of the analysis 
are presented.  In Chapter 6, conclusions of this study are drawn, the limitations 
of this study are stated, and the direction of possible future research is discussed. 
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CHAPTER II 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Marketing and economic researchers have extensively studied the dispersion of 
prices from many perspectives.  In this chapter, the relevant research on price 
dispersion is discussed.  First, research on the major sources of price dispersion 
(i.e., consumer heterogeneity, consumer search costs, and competition) is 
reviewed.  Second, research related to price dispersion in the airline market is 
examined.  Third, research on key independent variables related to strategic 
price competition‟s effect on price dispersion is discussed.   
 
Price Dispersion  
In order to better understand price dispersion, researchers have investigated and 
evaluated sources of price dispersion.  Economic research typically explains 
price dispersion as a violation of one of the Bertrand assumptions; (1) perfectly 
informed consumers (a requirement of consumer homogeneity), (2) zero search 
costs, or (3) product homogeneity (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000).  Bertrand 
competition is a model of price competition among duopoly firms, which set 
prices as though there was of perfect competition.  In a duopoly, two firms 
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dominate the market and in economic research, duopoly is the most common 
form of oligopoly studied.  The Bertrand assumptions rarely occur in real 
markets and research has explored the common exceptions to Bertrand 
competition.  Appendix 2 describes selected articles grouped by the authors‟ 
research area of interest related to price dispersion; (1) competition, (2) 
consumers, and (3) market structure.  
Sources of Price Dispersion  
Some of the early economic research evaluated the effect of product 
homogeneity on price dispersion (e.g., Griliches 1961; Chow 1967).  This 
research considers products to be bundles of characteristics, with price 
dispersion resulting from the combination of characteristics of a particular 
product.  In more recent studies product homogeneity is an assumption of price 
dispersion research.  On the other hand, consumer heterogeneity has regularly 
been demonstrated to be a major source of price dispersion.   
Consumer Heterogeneity - One aspect of consumer heterogeneity is the 
differences in the level of product information that individual consumers have 
available when making purchase decisions.  Price dispersion arising from 
consumers who are differentially informed of prices has been analyzed by 
economic researchers (see Salop and Stiglitz 1977 and Varian 1980).   In these 
models some consumers are informed of all prices and other consumers know 
only one price (and do not search for other prices).  The informed consumers 
purchase from the retailer with the lowest price; the uniformed consumers 
purchase from the retailer, if the price they are aware of is lower than their 
reservation price.  This typically results in some firms charging low prices in an 
 24 
 
 
attempt to attract informed consumers while other firms charge high prices to 
sell to uninformed consumers.   
Salop and Stiglitz (1977) studied consumer heterogeneity between two 
groups of consumers.  They provide a conceptual model and a theoretical 
analysis of the industry equilibrium for an economy in which imperfectly 
informed consumers can only become informed at a cost.  Salop and Stiglitz‟s 
assumption leads to a monopolistically competitive equilibrium and generally to 
price dispersion, even though the produce is homogenous. Salop and Stiglitz 
found that price dispersion depends on the magnitude of information costs 
between two consumer groups and degree of scale economies.  In the following 
section, other research (e.g., Stigler 1961, Salop and Stiglitz 1982) is discussed, 
which shows that consumer search costs have a major effect on price dispersion. 
Consumer Search Cost - Price dispersion arising from differences in consumer 
search cost has been analyzed by a many researchers.  Stigler (1961), in his 
seminal article on price dispersion, stated that price dispersion is ubiquitous 
even for homogeneous products.  He referred to price dispersion as “the measure 
of ignorance in the market” (p. 214).  Stigler argued that advertising is a 
“powerful instrument for the elimination of ignorance” (p. 220).  He also stated, 
“Dispersion is a biased measure of ignorance because there is never absolute 
homogeneity in the commodity if we include the „terms of sale‟ within the 
concept of the commodity” (p. 214).  Stigler‟s conclusion was that price 
dispersion was caused by consumers‟ lack of information due to search costs  
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and variation in „terms of sale‟ (including customer service and stocking of 
products) even for homogeneous products. 
Dahlby and West (1986) evaluated automobile insurance premiums over a 
seven-year period (1976-1981) and found that price dispersion existed in all 
driver classes (e.g., age, gender, marital status), for all territories, and years.  
They investigated consumer search costs, policy quality differences, and 
restriction on competition.  Dahlby and West concluded that in this market price 
dispersion was based primarily on consumer search costs.  Bakos (1997) 
theoretically analyzed the role of electronic marketplaces (e.g., Internet) in 
lowering search costs.  He focused on airline reservation systems, Internet-based 
electronic storefronts, and financial markets.  Bakos concluded that that lower 
search costs should lead to lower and less price dispersion.   
Sorensen (2000) studied consumer search as a source of price dispersion of 
prescription drugs.  He studied prices across two distinct markets and within the 
two markets.  Sorensen found that most of the price dispersion could be 
attributed to imperfect information, search costs, and motivation to search for 
lowest price.  Prices for drugs that are regularly purchased exhibited less price 
dispersion.  This was expected as consumer benefits of search increase over one-
time purchases.  Also, cross-sectional patterns in price variation were consistent 
with models based on consumer search.  In addition to the sources of price 
dispersion discussed in this section, the effect of competition among rival firms 
on price dispersion has only been studied to a limited degree. 
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Competition - Borenstein and Rose (1994) analyzed pricing of U.S. airlines to 
evaluate the effect of competition on price dispersion.  They state, “The 
strongest and most striking result in our work is the significant positive effect of 
competition on price dispersion” (p. 672).  Borenstein and Rose found 
competition to affect price dispersion across and within markets.  Their results 
are consistent with the predictions of competitive-type price discrimination 
models and they reject monopoly-type discrimination as the dominant source of 
airline price dispersion.  The variables used by Borenstein and Rose to evaluate 
the construct „competition‟ include market concentration, market share, market 
density, endpoint dominance, and market structure (i.e., monopoly, duopoly, or 
competitive market). 
Walsh and Whelan (1999) investigated effects of competition on price 
dispersion of related brands within product categories sold by independent shops 
in the Irish Grocery market.  They examined whether price dispersions of related 
brands is an outcome of brand pricing across different localized monopolies of 
an oligopolistic market.  Price dispersions of related brands could indicate 
differences in the prices of brands averaged over different shops with consumers 
having heterogeneous willingness to pay.  In this situation, price dispersion is 
driven by each brand exercising third-degree price discrimination, „monopoly 
type‟ pricing, across the different groups of shops in which they retail.  Walsh 
and Whelan (1999) referred to „monopoly type‟ pricing as each brand exercising 
third-degree price discrimination (i.e., varying prices by location or customer  
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segment) across the different groups of shops in which they retail (i.e., price 
dispersion within the brand). 
As mentioned above, third-degree price discrimination is sometimes 
referred to as monopoly type pricing.  Third-degree discrimination takes place 
when a firm sells its product to different consumers at different prices.  This is 
the most common form of price discrimination (Varian 1996).  Second-degree 
price discrimination takes place when a firm sells different amounts of its 
product at different prices, regardless of the consumer type (e.g., quantity 
discounts).  Second-degree discrimination is very commonly practiced.  First-
degree price discrimination takes place when a firm sells different amounts of its 
product at different prices and prices may vary by consumer type.  First-degree 
discrimination maximizes the firm‟s profit, but is very difficult to implement 
because the firm must know the customer‟s willingness to pay and be able to 
prevent resale. 
As Walsh and Whelan pointed out, research by Borenstein (1985) and 
Holmes (1989) suggest that brand pricing across shops could also reflect 
heterogeneous price competition environments.  Pricing within shops in this 
scenario is determined by the consumer‟s willingness to pay and the offsetting 
impact of price competition that is induced by consumer willingness to switch 
between related brands.  Overall, Walsh and Whelan found “brand distribution 
structures and their interaction with competition structures contribute 
significantly to price dispersion” (p. 342) across product categories. 
 
 28 
 
 
Walsh and Whelan applied the empirical methodology of Borenstein and 
Rose (1994) and found indirect evidence of „competitive type‟ affecting price 
dispersion, rather that „monopoly type‟ brand pricing over heterogeneous 
consumer segments.  Their results support brand pricing across consumer groups 
that induce varying degrees of localized imperfect price competition.  This 
finding provides indirect evidence that deficient consumer switching abilities 
become relatively more elastic in some consumer segments compared to others 
in response to competitive forces.   
As competition across firms increases, firms may choose to be more 
vertically differentiated (i.e., based on perceived quality differences) from each 
other to relax competition based on price.  If firms were positioned too close to 
each other, then consumers would choose between them on the basis of price, 
which would create the incentive to compete on price, and the net result would 
be lower profit for both firms (Moorthy 1988).  Firms may choose to be 
differentiated in dimensions, such as services and product assortment to soften 
price competition.   
Selected Marketing Research on Price Dispersion 
Marketing researchers have studied price dispersion in traditional markets, as 
well as in Internet markets.  Researchers have shown that the Internet provides 
sellers with speed and flexibility to change prices that have impacted price 
dispersion.  In the following sections, some important marketing research is 
discussed that focuses on traditional markets and Internet markets.   
Traditional Markets - Scholars in marketing have investigated the effects of 
price dispersion on key marketing variables as well as the causes of price 
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dispersion.  Burman and Biswas‟s (2004) study examined the moderating roles 
of contextual variable-market price dispersion for a product category (DVD 
payers), and that of an individual level variable-need for cognition, in 
influencing consumer evaluation of reference prices across two experiments.  
While most marketing researchers studied the causes of price dispersion (e.g., 
Borenstein and Rose 1994; Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000; Clemens, Hann, and 
Hitt 2002; Zhao 2006), a study by Burman and Biswas‟s (2004) is an example 
where the effect of price dispersion on consumer evaluation, an important 
marketing construct, is analyzed.   
The results of Burman and Biswas‟s study suggest that in situations where 
the price dispersion of a product category in a market is wide, consumers‟ 
expected price range becomes larger.  Similarly, when the price dispersion in the 
market is narrow, consumers do not expect large variations in prices of the 
product.  As a consequence, an implausible reference price is less likely to be 
discounted in the wide market price dispersion situation.  Consistent with 
assimilation-contrast theory, Burman and Biswas posited that an implausible 
reference price is more likely to have a positive effect on consumer evaluation 
when market price dispersion is wide than when it is narrow. 
Biswas (2004) examined how price dispersion and search efficiency, two 
key aspects of the economics of information theory, may be impacted 
differentially by the characteristics of the Internet.  An important implication of 
this study is that higher price dispersion on the Internet is due to versioning (i.e., 
different versions of products or information based on individual customer  
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needs) (Shapiro and Varian 1998; Whinston, Stahl, and Chio 1997).  Even 
though Biswas‟s study focuses on the Internet, airlines have been applying 
versioning to sell the same product at different prices to different customer 
classes (e.g., business and tourist) for many years. 
Zhao (2006) studied of price dispersion in the grocery market and checked 
for the consistency of evidence of price dispersion with the existing theories of 
price dispersion due to costly consumer heterogeneity, consumer search, and 
competition.  The three dimensions of price dispersion studied were; price 
dispersion for a certain brand across stores, price dispersion within a category in 
a store across brands, and price dispersion over time for a certain brand.  Results 
of the Zhao study showed price dispersion to be positively correlated with 
consumer search costs, competition, and consumer heterogeneity.  These results 
are consistent with the existing theories cited by Zhao. 
Internet Markets – The Internet provides new and interesting opportunities to 
evaluate the effects of dramatic changes in price transparency and consumers 
search cost on price dispersion.  The following are a few examples of major 
articles that investigate these changes.  Some of the Internet research compares 
and contrasts the influence of the Internet on price dispersion and adds to the 
understanding of both traditional and Internet markets.   
Bailey (1998) performed one of the earliest empirical research studies on 
Internet price dispersion.   He evaluated whether the Internet market was more 
efficient than the traditional market.   Bailey (1998) evaluated prices of books, 
music CDs, and software titles in 1996 and 1997 sold through Internet and  
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traditional outlets.   He found that price dispersion among e-tailers was at least 
as great as that among the traditional retailers.  This finding is contrary to the 
expectation that online markets are closer to purely competitive markets due to 
reduced consumer search cost.  Bailey‟s (1998) study was exploratory and 
comprised only low-involvement product categories.  
In the classic Bertrand model of price competition, products are perfectly 
homogenous, retailers are afforded no spatial advantages in attracting 
consumers, and consumers are informed of all prices (Brynjolfsson and Smith 
2000).  The result is that competition occurs only in price, consumers buy from 
the lowest priced retailer, and retailers all set the same price, a price equal to 
marginal cost.  In reality, the existent of price dispersion is one of economics‟ 
most replicated findings (see Dahlby and West, 1986, and Sorensen, 2000 as 
examples). 
Considering these factors alone, only a small degree of price dispersion on 
the Internet was expected by Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000).  With regard to 
product homogeneity, Brynjolfsson and Smith intentionally selected products 
(books and CDs) whose physical characteristics are entirely homogeneous.  
Considering search costs, they expected lower search costs on the Internet than 
in traditional channels.  Similarly, they expected the role of informed and 
uninformed consumers to be less a factor in dispersion among Internet prices 
than it is among traditional prices. 
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) compared pricing behavior at Internet and 
traditional retail outlets.  A key finding related to price dispersion was that levels  
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of price dispersion depend importantly on the measures employed.  When they 
compared the prices posted by different Internet retailers, they found substantial 
price dispersion.  Internet retailer prices differ by an average of 33% for books 
and 25% for CDs.  However, when Brynjolfsson and Smith weighted these 
prices by proxies for market share, they found that price dispersion is lower in 
Internet channels than in traditional channels, reflecting dominance of certain 
heavily branded retailers. 
Because the Internet is a multifaceted market, Brynjolfsson and Smith 
stated that it is worth looking at the question of dispersion from a variety of 
perspectives.  First they analyzed several aspects of price dispersion by looking 
at posted prices.  Then they repeated the analysis after weighting all the price 
observations by a proxy for market share in each channel.  Each of the measures 
highlights different aspects of Internet commerce, and both measures are useful 
in characterizing Internet markets.  Dispersion in posted prices corresponds to 
the price difference consumers would find, if they were equally likely to observe 
prices from any store, e.g., after using a price comparison intermediary or some 
other listing of retailers, or if they searched among all the retailers in their 
sample without revisiting the same store repeatedly.  Dispersion in weighted 
prices corresponds roughly to the prices one would observe by recording the 
prices consumers actually pay for goods on the Internet and in traditional 
outlets.  They analyzed dispersion resulting from posted and weighted prices.  
 Brynjolfsson and Smith created both absolute and relative measures to 
analyze dispersion in posted prices.  Both measures reveal higher than expected  
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dispersion in Internet prices.  Absolute dispersion statistics show a substantial 
range of prices available on the Internet for the same book or CD in the same 
period.  Brynjolfsson and Smith considered two tests of relative dispersion in 
posted prices across channels.  First they compared measures of price range, 
trimmed range, and standard deviation between the Internet and traditional 
channels.  Second, they used kernel density plots to graphically analyze the 
dispersion of prices across their mean. 
Anacarani and Shankar (2004) evaluated price dispersion of books and 
music CDs across Internet-only retailers (pure-play e-tailers), traditional 
retailers (bricks-and-mortar), and multi-channel retailers (bricks-and-clicks) 
retailers.  Their results, based on 13,720 price quotes, showed that multi-channel 
retailers had higher price dispersion, with or without shipping costs.  Traditional 
retailers had the second highest price dispersion and Internet-only retailers had 
the lowest price dispersion.  These findings indicate that the online markets offer 
opportunities for retailers to differentiate prices within and across the retailer 
types, similar to traditional markets.  
Next, price dispersion in the airline industry is discussed.  Airline ticket 
prices are well known for price dispersion.  The data collected on a wide range 
of variables and the availability of data makes it a market that has drawn the 
attention of both economic and marketing researchers.  This study focuses on 
the effect of competition on price dispersion in the airline industry.  
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Price Dispersion in the Airline Industry 
Price dispersion in the airline industry has been a topic of research among 
academic scholars for several decades.  It is a fixed capacity, service industry 
that has seen momentous changes (e.g., entrance of low-fare airlines, the advent 
of Internet ticket sales).  The follow sections provide a brief review of articles 
representing the perspective of economic researchers and the effect that revenue 
management systems has on price dispersion. 
Economic Perspective 
Economic scholars study price dispersion in the airline industry to gain 
understanding of the drivers of price dispersion.  A major study in this area of 
research is the work by Borenstein and Rose (1994), who analyze price 
dispersion of airline ticket fares charged to different passengers on the same 
route.  They found that price dispersion increases on routes with more 
competition or lower flight density, consistent with discrimination based on 
customers‟ willingness to switch to alternative airlines or alternative flights.  
Borenstein and Rose argue that the data support models of price discrimination 
in monopolistic, competitive markets. 
 Borenstein and Rose (1994) show empirically that price dispersion is 
greater on city-pair routes that are served by a larger number of carriers.  They 
attribute this result to price discrimination and argue that point using a 
monopolistic-competition model with certain demand.  Borenstein and Rose 
(1994) place the sources of price dispersion in two broad categories; 
discriminatory pricing and costs of serving different customers.  Within the 
discriminatory pricing category, they evaluate market structure variables (e.g., 
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market concentration), population attributes (e.g., passenger types), and product 
characteristics (e.g., frequent flyer plans).   Within the „cost of serving different 
customers‟ category are two types of peak-load pricing strategies; systematic 
and stochastic. 
Dana (1999) evaluates the situation when capacity is costly and prices are 
set in advance.  He suggests that firms facing uncertain demand will sell output 
at multiple prices and limit the quantity available at each price.  Dana shows that 
the optimal price strategy of a monopolist and the unique, pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium of oligopolists both exhibit intra-firm price dispersion.  Moreover, 
as the market becomes more competitive, prices become more dispersed, a 
pattern documented in the airline industry.  While generating similar predictions, 
the model differs from the revenue management literature because it disregards 
market segmentation and fare restrictions that screen customers. 
Dana‟s (1999) article was the first to extend Prescott‟s (1975) model to 
monopoly and imperfect competition.  By expanding firms‟ strategy sets to 
include price distributions, i.e., sets of prices and quantity limits at each price, he 
showed that there exists a unique, pure-strategy equilibrium in price 
distributions when no pure-strategy equilibrium exists in prices.  In other words, 
the model predicts equilibrium with intra-firm price dispersion in which each 
firm offers its output at multiple prices (as opposed to random prices).  The 
oligopoly equilibrium is symmetric and the market price distribution converges 
to Prescott‟s competitive equilibrium as the number of firms approaches infinity.   
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As competition increases, the average price level falls and the degree of price 
dispersion increases.   
The inverse correlation between price dispersion and market concentration 
has been observed in the airline industry.  Borenstein and Rose (1994) show 
empirically that price dispersion is greater on city-pair routes that are served by 
a larger number of carriers.  Borenstein and Rose attribute this result to price 
discrimination and argue that point using a monopolistic-competition model 
with certain demand.  However, their empirical results are also consistent with 
this article‟s theory that price dispersion is due to capacity costs (i.e., perishable 
assets) and demand uncertainty.  Furthermore, this model is consistent with 
other characteristics of the airline industry, characteristics that the price 
discrimination theory does not address.   
Another major study in this area of research is the work by Clemens, Hann, 
and Hitt (2002), who evaluated price dispersion of airline tickets offered by 
online travel agents (OTAs).   They considered the presence or absence of price 
dispersion in airline tickets, a complex product with multiple, quality attributes.  
Most previous work on price dispersion in Internet markets has been done on 
commodities, such as books and CDs.  Their results suggest that in markets with 
low search costs and strong incentives for consumer search, there is persistent 
price dispersion across service providers.   
Klein and Loebbecke (2003) compared online and offline pricing strategies 
with a particular focus on airline ticket sales.  The basis of their study was a 
setting of structural changes in the airline industry and changing customer  
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behavior.  They took a critical look at predictions about the proliferation and 
success of flexible pricing schemes that were made at the end of the 1990s.  
Interpretive analysis and empirical evidence of Web-based pricing mechanisms, 
which aim at giving customers access to lower prices, lead to a method for 
developing pricing strategies that reflect the competitive environment of the 
online market space. 
As stated by Klein and Loebbecke “In the real world, few sellers act under 
conditions of either perfect competition of monopolistic markets.  Instead of 
having to accept the market price, sellers have to develop their own pricing 
strategies and revenue management” (p. 47).  Strategies that try to optimally 
match various customers‟ desires are based on market research insights (Dolan 
and Simon 1996).  Empirical data shows that differential pricing is already 
widespread in industries that exhibit large fixed costs like airlines, 
telecommunications, or publishing (Varian 1996).  Some market segments could 
not be served without differential pricing and it can even be shown that 
differential pricing contributes to economic efficiency (Dolan and Simon 1996, 
Varian 1996).   
Revenue management has been applied in a number of markets where the 
product is a service with fixed capacity in the short term and is a market that can 
be segmented.  Examples of these types of services where revenue management 
have been applied are airlines, passenger trains, car rental, hotels, casinos, 
electric power distribution, and broadcasting.  This study focuses on the airline  
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market where revenue management has been used extensively for over 20 years.  
The next section describes how revenue management affects price dispersion. 
Revenue Management’s Influence on Price Dispersion 
Revenue management (also referred to as yield management) began in the early 
1970s in the airline industry to manage capacity sold at discounted fares.   These 
discounted fares were targeted at leisure travelers and simultaneously 
minimizing the dilution of revenue from business travelers who were willing 
and able to pay full fares.  The term „revenue management‟ is commonly used to 
describe most aspects of airlines pricing and seat-inventory control decisions; 
but in reality, revenue managers primarily practice seat-inventory control (Dana 
1999).  Revenue management is an analytical process developed to manage 
capacity and maximize profitability (Talluri and Ryzin 2004).  Improvements in 
computer technology made it practical for statistical forecasting techniques and 
mathematical optimizing methods to be applied dynamically to determine 
optimal prices that result in revenue and profit maximization.  Also, when 
applied properly, revenue management can help organizations achieve high 
levels of allocation efficiency, innovative product differentiation, and unique 
positioning.  A study by Hendler and Hendler (2004) provides an excellent 
example of how revenue management can be applied successfully to improve 
allocation efficiency, product differentiation, and positioning.  Furthermore, 
research has shown that after revenue management has been implemented, 
revenues of firms have improved 3 to 7 percent and profits have increased 50 to 
100 percent (Cross 1997). 
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From the economic perspective, revenue management increases airlines‟ 
profits three ways.  First, it implements peak-load pricing.  Second, it 
implements third-degree price discrimination.  That is, fare restrictions screen 
customers and segment them by their sensitivity to price (i.e., willingness to 
pay) and potentially by their demand uncertainty.  And third, it implements an 
inventory control system for coping with uncertain demand for a perishable 
asset.  Revenue management has proven to be effective improving the revenue 
and profitability of airlines.  The success of revenue management has led to it 
being widely adopted throughout the airline industry. 
 In practice, revenue management has traditionally described several 
separate functions within an airline‟s organization (Cross 1997).  First, the 
collection of sales data used to generate a sales forecast.  Second, the fare setting 
department, which determines the restrictions that passengers, meets and sets the 
prices of tickets.  Fares apply to many flights, and any limits on departure dates 
or times are specified as restrictions on the fare.  These departments closely 
monitor competitors‟ fares on computer reservation systems and quickly match 
any of their price changes.  Third, a computerized system determines, given 
demand forecasts and fares, the optimal limit on the number of seats sold at each 
fare and then transmits that info to a computer reservation system.  With the 
increasing power on information technology, revenue management has 
improved in efficiency of collecting data and adjusting discounts to optimize 
revenue. 
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 Belobaba (1987) reported the results of a survey of airline revenue 
management practices.  The subsequent development and adoption of better 
tools for demand forecasting and computerized dynamic seat-inventory control 
have drastically changed airline competition.  However, one-shot selection of 
prices and quantities early in the history of revenue management does seem to 
closely mirror the pricing assumption in the model presented here.  Although the 
model has obvious limits, it is nevertheless consistent with stylized facts about 
airlines.  In particular, capacity utilization rates are higher for seat-inventory 
allocations of low-fare seats.  While info about capacity utilization by fare (i.e., 
price) within an airline is proprietary (because seat-inventory control is 
proprietary), this is a direct consequence of the algorithms used by the revenue 
management computers.    
Next the effects of strategic price competition on price dispersion are 
discussed.  This is a gap in the research that needs to be understood.  The focus 
of this research is to evaluate and explain the influence of key competition-
related variables on price dispersion in a major service industry, airlines. 
 
Strategic Price Competition 
“Pricing is possibly the market‟s most important economic variables” (Hansen 
and Solgaard 2004, p. 99).  Price is the only marketing mix variable that 
provides income to the seller, as the others (i.e., product, place, and promotion) 
are costs to the seller. From the buyer‟s perspective, price is a fundamental 
factor that is assessed by a potential customer when appraising the value of a 
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product.  Two recently developed competition-related variables that are 
evaluated in this study are multi-market contact and strategic similarity. 
Multi-Market Contact  
Some of the articles in this section discuss both multi-market contact and 
strategic similarity because the research studied the relationship between these 
two constructs.  Gimeno and Woo (1996) performed an empirical analysis of 
data from over 3,000 city-pair markets of the U.S. airline industry.  Their paper 
focuses on the effects of changes in multi-market contact and strategic similarity 
in a city-pair market on the prices charged by airlines in that market.  Other 
important factors which influence prices, such as service attributes, market 
characteristics, cost positions, market structure and firm-specific advantages, are 
rigorously controlled.  The methodology used for the empirical analysis, a panel 
data regression with fixed-effect intercepts, also serves as a control for other 
sources of stable differences across airlines and city-markets. 
 The results of the Gimeno and Woo study showed that multi-market contact 
strongly decreases the intensity of rivalry, whereas strategic similarity 
moderately increases it.  Interestingly, the findings suggest that the effect of 
strategic similarity on intensity of rivalry may be biased if the effect of multi-
market contact is not explicitly accounted for.  This is due to the fact that 
strategic similarity may capture some of the strong de-escalation effect of multi-
market contact when this variable is not controlled.  This finding explains and 
challenges prior literature, which found that strategic similarity reduces rivalry. 
The findings of Gimeno and Woo have important theoretical implications.  
For strategic group theory, they suggest two distinct dimensions of strategic 
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heterogeneity (strategic similarity, multi-market contact), which should not be 
aggregated because they have opposite effects on the intensity of rivalry.  These 
two dimensions should be separately considered to produce more rigorous 
analysis of rivalry within and between strategic groups.  For hyper-competition 
theory, the findings indicate that hyper competition in the cost-quality arena and 
stronghold invasion arena may lead in the future to greater competitive restraint.  
If hyper-competition in the cost-quality arena leads to greater differentiation in 
the market positions of firms, this could de-escalate competition.  In addition, if 
hyper-competition in the stronghold invasion arena leads firms to obtain a 
broader multi-market overlap with their rivals, this condition could also provide 
the basis for deterrence and hyper-competitive de-escalation.    
Baum and Korn (1996) examined how firm-specific competitive conditions 
influence firms‟ pattern of market entry and exit, focusing on two features of 
firms‟ competitive conditions: market domain overlap, which measures the 
potential for competition, and multi-market contact, which gages the potential 
for mutual forbearance.  An analysis of commuter airlines showed that increases 
in market domain overlap raised airlines‟ rates of market entry and exit, but 
increases in multi-market contact lowered them, especially in markets clearly 
dominated by a single airline.  Thus, paradoxically, close competitors are not the 
most intense rivals; airlines that meet in multiple markets are less aggressive 
toward each other than those that meet in one of a few markets.   
Strategic Similarity 
The construct, strategic similarity, evolved from research on strategic groups.  
The term strategic group was coined by Hunt (1972).  A strategic group is a 
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cluster of firms within an industry that have similar characteristics, including 
similar overall business strategies (i.e., strategic similarity) (Porter 1979).  Cool 
and Schendel (1987) studied strategic groups in the U.S. pharmaceutical 
industry over the period 1963-1982.  They identify six strategic groups having 
strategic similarity.  Also, performance differences between the strategic groups 
were found to correlate with market share.   
Fiegenbaum and Thomas‟s (1990) study found significant differences over 
time across strategic groups in five out of nine performance measures.  Mehra 
(1996) studied strategic groups in the U.S. banking industry.  He found 
significant profitability and productivity differences between market-based, 
strategic groups.  The market-based, strategic groups in the Mehra (1996) study 
are similar in formation to the groups of strategically similar firms applied in 
this current study. 
Market Concentration 
Like mutual forbearance theory, oligopoly theory is concerned with inter-firm 
coordination (Baum and Korn 1996).  In oligopoly theory, collusion, either tacit 
or purposive, among firms is viewed as occurring because firms recognize their 
mutual dependence.  However, in oligopoly theory, coordination derives from 
greater market concentration (i.e., small number of sellers, each with market 
power), not from multi-market contact (Scherer and Ross 1990). 
 Linked oligopoly theory (Solomon 1970) presents a view more similar to 
mutual forbearance (Baum and Korn 1996).  It suggests that an important 
determinant of performance in oligopolistic market is the degree of linkage 
between markets or firms‟ presence in multiple markets.  Solomon argued that 
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markets must be viewed as linked clusters if the behavior of multi-market firms 
is to be understood.  Therefore, like mutual forbearance, linked oligopoly theory 
assumes that multi-market firms coordinate their operations across markets and 
that this coordination affects the intensity of rivalry.  Consequently, considering 
only the structure of individual markets may be misleading because multi-
market contact will likely reduce rivalry, even in concentrated markets 
(Heggestad and Rhoades 1978). 
 These theories suggest that the structure of particular markets within which 
firms engage, especially the level of concentration in those markets, is likely to 
affect the relationship between multi-market contact and mutual forbearance 
(Baum and Korn 1996).  In particular, it seems likely that mutual forbearance 
will be more influential in concentrated markets.  The rationale for this is that it 
is easier for oligopolists who are multipoint rivals to collude and forbear from 
intense rivalry, even easier than it is for multi-point rivals in less concentrated 
markets to do so.  Thus, multi-market contact can potentially strengthen 
oligopolistic coordination within specific markets.  Theoretical analysis 
(Bernheim and Whinston 1990), empirical research (Scott 1982, 1991), and 
experimental research (Phillips and Mason 1992) support the idea that mutual 
forbearance will be greatest when market concentration is high. 
 In the next chapter, the conceptual framework that is applied in this study to 
examine the relationship between the independent variables related to 
competition and the dependent variable, price dispersion are introduced and 
explained. 
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CHAPTER III 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Economists often mention the “law of one price”, which suggests that supply 
and demand will determine a single price for a homogenous product, regardless 
of the number of sellers and buyers.  In reality, it is well known by marketing 
scholars and economists that this rarely, if ever, occurs in real markets.  
Homogeneous products are often sold at widely differing prices by competing 
firms, even in markets that are highly competitive, such as the U.S. airline ticket 
market.  It is widely known and accepted that a wide range of prices can exist 
for the same airline ticket.  Price dispersion may be further expanded by the 
ticket prices of rival airlines, which may have different strategies that may affect 
their pricing.  This study explores some key factors that may influence price 
dispersion and evaluates the consistency with theories, which provide direction 
on the factors that may affect price dispersion.  This research is the first study, 
known to the author, to focus on evaluating multi-market contact and strategic 
similarity as influencers of price dispersion. 
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The effects of variations in consumer heterogeneity on price dispersion 
have been studied by such scholars as Diamond (1987), Shepard (1991), 
Borenstein and Rose (1994), Clemons, Hann, and Hitt (2002), and Zhao (2006).  
Consumer heterogeneity can be based on such consumer differences as their 
price sensitivity, preferences, or willingness to pay.  In the case of the airfare 
market, consumer heterogeneity is typically evaluated on the basis of business 
traveler versus vacation traveler.  Borenstein and Rose (1994) studied the effects 
of difference in business passengers versus vacation passengers on price 
dispersion of airline tickets sold on 521 domestic routes served by major 
airlines.  Clemons, Hann, and Hitt (2002) studied the effects of difference in 
time-sensitive travelers (i.e., business travelers) versus price-sensitive travelers 
(i.e., vacation travelers) on price dispersion of airline tickets sold online.  Both 
of these studies found consumer heterogeneity to be a contributing factor to 
price dispersion.     
The effects of variations in consumer search costs on price dispersion have 
been extensively studied, going back to Stigler‟s (1961) seminal article on price 
dispersion.  Appendix 1 provides a list of selected articles that study consumer 
search costs affects on price dispersion.  In the case of the airline ticket market, 
consumer search costs have been low compared to most markets due to 
independent travel agents and more recently online travels agents (Clemons, 
Hann, and Hitt 2002).  The economic theory of search implies that when 
customers have low search costs, equilibrium prices will converge to marginal 
cost, eliminating price dispersion.  Even though research has shown search costs  
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in the airline ticket market to be extremely low, price dispersion is relatively 
high.  Therefore, other factors must be creating price dispersions.  In this current 
study, the focus is on competitive factors and local market conditions that may 
contribute to price dispersion. 
The effects of competition have been applied to evaluate a number of 
factors that relate to firm performance, such as intensity of rivalry, market entry 
and exit rates, price levels, and price dispersion.  Empirical research, notably 
Borenstein and Rose 1994, Walsh and Whelan 1999, and Zhao 2006, indicates 
that price dispersion is influenced by competition, but the effects of competition 
on price dispersion have not been thoroughly evaluated.  For instance, the 
effects of competition in complex industries, such as the U.S. airline industry, 
where there are numerous competitors competing in a wide range of local 
markets with different strategies, are not well understood.  The effects of price 
dispersion of two very important factors, multi-market contact and strategic 
similarity, have not been evaluated. As a result, there is a major gap in the 
research on competition‟s potential effects on price dispersion.  The purpose of 
this study is to fill the gap in this important line of research. 
The conceptual framework is illustrated in   1.  As shown in the diagram, 
price dispersion is influenced by two groups of independent variables; one group 
of competition related characteristics and another group of local market related 
characteristics.  The following conceptual framework indicates the expected 
relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable, 
price dispersion.   
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Figure 1 - Price Dispersion Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Note:  Dotted lines indicate interactions between variables. 
 
In this chapter the above proposed conceptual framework is explained, the 
theories related to price dispersion are examined, and the development of the 
hypotheses explained.  Since George J. Stigler‟s 1961 article first described how 
price dispersion is affected by advertising‟s influence on consumer search costs, 
price dispersion has been the focus of many economic and marketing 
researchers.  Both economic and marketing researchers have conducted many 
studies related to price dispersion.  Recent marketing research has continued to 
expand the understanding of the causes of price dispersion (e.g., Borenstein and 
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Rose 1994; Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000; Clemens, Hann, and Hitt 2002; Zhao 
2006 and its affects on consumers (e.g., Burman and Biswas 2004).  See 
appendixes 1 and 2 for more information on these studies. 
 
Price Dispersion – Theoretical Background 
Price dispersion is generally defined as the variation in prices of a specific 
product.  Stigler (1961, p. 214) stated that “Price dispersion is a manifestation---
and, indeed, it is the measure---of ignorance in the market.”  What Stigler was 
referring to as “ignorance” was that lack of knowledge of the prices in the 
marketplace increases price dispersion because some customers lack the 
opportunity or information to compare prices. 
In this current study, price dispersion is the variation in airline ticket prices 
for the same city pair route offered by competing airlines.  Price dispersion is 
determined by many factors.  The focus of this study is to understand the 
influences of competition on price dispersion given a range of market 
conditions. 
 One may ask why it is important to understand how competitive forces and 
market characteristics impact price dispersion.  Price dispersion has been studied 
by marketing researchers for decades because of the impact that pricing has on 
consumers, as well as sales revenue and profitability of firms and industries.  If 
the forces affecting price dispersion are better understood, managers may be 
able to develop better business strategies and plans.  
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Firms, such as airlines, competing in many local markets and against 
competitors with distinctly different strategies may be able to improve their 
financial performance by applying additional knowledge of how competition 
and firms with different strategies impact their pricing options.  For example, if 
prices of an airline ticket for a route are different between two airlines as often 
occurs.  Then, if a manager at the higher priced airline knows and understands 
that the price difference is due to identifiable characteristics of the competitor 
and the local market, the firm does not need to lower the price to match the 
competitor‟s price and can be more profitable. 
While some causes of price dispersion have been thoroughly researched, 
there remain theoretical and practical issues of interest, specifically regarding 
competition.  Of specific interest is how the levels of multi-market contact and 
the differences in strategic similarity affect price dispersion.  By providing new 
insight into answering this question, this research may provide managers with 
more information to make more effective decisions when developing marketing 
strategies. 
Theories Related to Price Dispersion 
The article by Burman and Biswas (2004) provides an excellent discussion of 
the theories related to price dispersion.  Adaptation-level theory implies that the 
magnitude of impact of a price depends on the consumer‟s adaptation level, and 
in most cases this adaptation level is not the price that physically appears on the 
product but the price that consumers form in their minds due to past experience 
or knowledge (Kalyanaram and Little 1994; Janiszewski and Lichtenstein 1999; 
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Burman and Biswas 2004).  The price range that consumers evoke in their minds 
is used to determine the attractiveness of the market price.   
The evoked price range is not only influenced by the advertised selling and 
reference prices (Della Bitta, Monroe, and McGinnis 1981), but also by the 
variability in the prices (i.e., price dispersion) in the marketplace (Kalyanaram 
and Little 1994).  Based on the above implications, Burman and Biswas‟s (2004) 
research showed that in situations when price dispersion of a product category in 
the market is wide, consumers‟ expected price range becomes larger.  Similarly, 
when the price dispersion in the market is narrow, consumers do not expect 
large variations in prices of the product.   
 As an example of adaptation-level theory, when purchasing airline tickets, 
consumers expect a wide range of prices due to differences in the type of airline 
(e.g., network or low fare) and amount of seats available on the flight.  
However, when consumers purchase a Big Mac at McDonalds, they expect the 
price to be within a narrow band of prices.  Consumers adapt to the prices they 
have encountered in their recent past.  Price dispersion within local markets 
affects the price variations that consumers expect and adapt to when considering 
a purchase. 
 Range theory has been applied to price dispersion when considering a 
consumers‟ range of expected prices (Janiszewski and Lichtenstein 1999).  
Range theory is based on consumers‟ sensory perceptions that the range of 
values of the stimuli determines the perceived value of any one stimulus in the 
range.  Furthermore, range theory suggests that consumers use the range of  
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remembered price experiences to set a lower and upper bound of price 
expectations and the attractiveness of a market price is a function of its relative 
location within the range.  This implies that the attractiveness of a price is 
affected by consumers‟ evaluations in relation to the end points of their evoked, 
acceptable price range (i.e., price dispersion range).   For example, when 
purchasing airline tickets, consumers have a range in mind that they expect they 
may have to pay for the ticket.  The consumer perceives the value based to the 
actual price relative to the upper and lower bound of the expected price range.  
This price range is influenced by the actual price dispersion within the city-pair 
route that the consumer is traveling. 
Assimilation-contrast theory is related to price dispersion in that prices that 
fall within the range of a consumers‟ acceptance are assimilated.  Those prices 
falling outside the range of acceptance are rejected and become a contrast to the 
acceptable price range (i.e., price dispersion).  Assimilation-contrast theory has 
been applied to consumers‟ integration of pricing information by such academic 
scholars as Sherif (1963), Monroe (1971), Monroe and Petroshius (1981), and 
Diamond and Campbell (1989).  In the case of airline tickets, a consumer‟s 
knowledge of the price dispersion for a given city-pair route will influence the 
endpoints of the range of acceptance.  Prices outside the range will seem to be 
unreasonably high or surprisingly low.  Also, prices slightly outside the range of 
acceptance can result in a movement of the acceptable range in the direction of 
the new price.  
“Signaling theory is based on the premise that often information asymmetry 
exists between two parties to a transaction such that one party possesses 
 53 
 
 
information the other party lacks but desires to possess (Spence 1974, 2002).  In 
the context of market exchanges, sellers often possess information the buyers do 
not have easy access to, such as true product quality or the location of retailers‟ 
offer prices in the actual dispersion of market prices” (Biswas, Dutta, and Pullig 
2006, p. 246).  Consumers use signals, such as price as an indicator of product 
quality and firm reliability (Spence 1974, Srivastava and Lurie 2004, Dixit and 
Chintagunta 2007).  For example, consumers normally expect higher service 
levels from network airlines, typically charging higher prices, than they do from 
the low-fare airlines.  The various prices in this situation are signaling the 
service levels that may be provided. 
In summary, consumers typically have a range of prices in mind for a given 
product.  The service levels associated with various supplies of the product can 
influence the range of prices (i.e., price dispersion).  In the case of the airline 
industry, the range of acceptable prices may be influenced by the number of 
airlines (i.e., suppliers) on the city-pair route and the level of services provided, 
which is related to the product delivery strategy.  From the airlines perspective, 
the consumers‟ willingness to accept a variety of prices for the same route 
provides an opportunity to adjust prices based on the prevailing conditions at the 
time of sale.  Both the supply variability and the demand variability result in 
price dispersion.  This current study provides insight into the various influencing 
factors that affect price dispersion, which can be important and useful for 
airlines when developing and evaluating competitive strategy and tactics. 
Competition, Market Characteristics, and Price Dispersion 
According to the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, market 
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structure and firm conduct could be important indicators of firm performance 
and long-term sustainable competitive advantage (Bain 1956, Porter 1985).  The 
SCP paradigm is a central model in the study of „industrial organization‟, a field 
of economics, which focuses on the strategic behavior of firms, structures of 
markets, and between firm relationships.  Caves (1972) and Scherer (1980) 
argue that market performance is dependent upon the behavior of firms 
pertaining to matters such as product and pricing strategy.  The behavior of 
firms‟ is influenced by the structure of the market, which includes features that 
characterize the relevant market (Alashban, Hayes, Zinkhan, and Balas 2001).    
One outcome of a firm having a sustainable competitive advantage is often 
higher prices than those of firms without a sustainable competitive advantage 
(Porter 1985).  A simple example that demonstrates a clear connection between 
sustainable competitive advantage and price levels is patented pharmaceutical 
drugs.  The patent provides the sustainable competitive advantage that creates a 
monopolistic condition that results in higher than normal prices.  Consumers 
who value the competitive advantage are typically willing to pay for additional 
benefit provided.  The diversity of competitive advantages that sometimes occur 
between competing firms and the resulting benefits to consumers, likely 
contribute to price dispersion.   
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the influence of multi-market 
contact, strategic similarity and other key competition and market related 
variables on price dispersion.  A distinguishing aspect of this study is the 
integration of multi-market contact and strategic similarity in the analysis of  
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price dispersion.  Multi-market contact has been shown to be an important 
influence on competitive intensity.  An extension of the line of research is to 
gain understanding of the potential affect on price dispersion.     
Research on strategic similarity has shown it to be an important 
consideration when evaluating how firms interact.  In the case of the airline 
industry, one of the major strategic differences between competing firms is their 
pricing strategy.  The expected effects of these variables and other competition 
and market related variables are discussed next. 
Multi-Market Contact 
Multi-market contact is defined as the level of competitive contact, which firms 
in an industry have in multiple markets (Bernheim and Whinston 1990; Karnani 
and Wernerfelt 1985; Evans and Kessides 1994; Baum and Korn 1996; Gimeno 
and Woo 1996).  For any pair of rivals in a market, multi-market contact 
represents the number of other markets in which the same pair of firms meets as 
competitors.  Thus, multi-market contact between two competing firms in a 
given market reflects the degree of market overlap between those firms in the 
other markets. 
The theory of multi-market competition (Jayachandran, Gimeno, and 
Varadarajan 1999) implies that multi-market contact between two rival firms 
will reduce the intensity of rivalry between them in each market where they 
compete (Edwards 1955; Bernheim and Whinston 1990).  Even though multi-
market contact indicates that firms are competitors across sub-markets, the 
theory suggests that the intensity of rivalry in each of the mutually contested 
markets will be low.  The reason for such an effect, according to the theory, is 
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that firms with high multi-market contact have an extended scope for retaliation 
to actions taken by the rival (Feinberg 1984), because the possibility for cross-
market retaliation is a likely possibility (Gimeno and Woo 1996).   
The development of multi-market contact may induce periods of intense 
rivalry, as firms enter each other‟s markets (Karani and Wernerfelt 1985).  
However, once multi-market contacts are in place, and as firms mutually 
recognize that actions taken on one market may have implications in other 
markets, firms will forbear from additional disruption (Edwards 1955).  This 
rationale has been indicated by theoretical predictions of Karnani and Wernerfelt 
(1985) and Bernheim and Whinston (1990).  Empirical evidence has been 
provided by the studies of Scott (1982), Phillips and Mason (1992), Evans and 
Kessides (1994), Baum and Korn (1996), and Gimeno and Woo (1996) 
Evans and Kessides (1994) studied the influence of multi-market contact on 
price levels in the U.S. airline industry.  Their analysis determined that there is a 
statistically significant influence on price levels.  Fares were found to be higher 
in city-pair routes served by airlines with extensive multi-market contact.  Evans 
and Kessides considered the U.S. airline industry to be an “ideal candidate” for 
testing multi-market contact because the airline industry; (1) has been identified 
as having potential gains from multi-market contact, (2) has clearly identifiable 
sub-markets (i.e., city-pair routes), and (3) there is precise data available.  The 
Evans and Kessides study supports the notion that multi-market contact may 
increase with multi-market contact in markets where there are airlines with low 
levels of multi-market contact competing along with airlines with high levels of 
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multi-market contact.  This would support the notion of an inverted-U 
relationship between multi-market contact and price dispersion. 
Baum and Korn (1996) studied how firm-specific competitive conditions 
influence firms‟ likelihood of entering and exiting markets.  They applied multi-
market contact as an independent variable to evaluate the entry and exit of 
California commuter airlines from 1979 to 1984.  Baum and Korn demonstrated 
that firms that meet in many markets compete less aggressively than firms 
meeting in only a few markets.  Baum and Korn found that as multi-market 
contact increased, the entry and exit rates decreased, indicating that 
competitiveness reduced as multi-market contact increased.  This study supports 
the premise that if firms feel less need to compete aggressively, they have more 
latitude in pricing, therefore increasing price dispersion as multi-market contact 
increases. 
Gimeno and Woo (1996) studied the effects of multi-market contact and 
strategic similarity on intensity of rivalry in the airline industry.  Gimeno and 
Woo performed an empirical analysis of over 3,000 city-pair markets of the U.S. 
airline industry.  They focused on the effects of changes in multi-market contact 
in a city-pair market on the prices charged by airlines in that market.  Other 
important factors which influence prices, such as service attributes, market 
characteristics, cost positions, market structure and firm-specific advantages, 
were rigorously controlled.  Their findings support their hypothesis that average 
multi-market contact will strongly decrease the intensity of rivalry experienced 
by a firm.   
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Although there are differing views on the influence that multi-market 
contact may have on competition, the conclusions of most research supports the 
premise that as multi-market contact increases, intensity of rivalry will decrease.  
This decrease in competitive rivalry is expected to result in increased price 
dispersion due to firms feeling less pressure to match or be close to competitors‟ 
prices.  The theoretical predictions are consistent with the rivalry-decreasing 
effect of multi-market contact on price dispersion and are represented in the 
following hypothesis: 
   
H1: The degree of multi-market contact among firms competing in a local  
market is positively related to price dispersion in the local market. 
 
Strategic Similarity  
Strategic similarity is defined as similarity in the general pattern of resource 
deployment and competitive orientations independent of the specific market 
served by the firm (Hatten and Hatten 1987).  In the airline industry, the key 
competitive orientation is the difference in pricing strategies employed and 
service amenities provided.   
The predictions in the literature about the effect of strategic similarity on 
the intensity of rivalry are mixed.  While research on hyper-competition and 
product differentiation predict that strategic similarity will likely increase 
rivalry, strategic group theory proposes that strategic similarity may lead to 
lower rivalry.  Recent research tends to support the view that high levels of 
strategic similarity will likely increase rivalry. 
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D‟Aveni (1994) in his discussion of hyper-competition suggests that 
similarly positioned rivals are most likely to engage in intense price wars with 
little restraint, but also explicitly recognizes that differentiated rivals may in 
some cases be just as active and disruptive as similar rivals.  Cool and Dierickx 
(1993) argue that it is not clear why rivalry among group members should be 
less intense than competition coming from firms in other groups.  The empirical 
studies of Shepard (1991), Gimeno and Woo (1996), and Fuentelsaz Gomez 
(2006) provide support to the position that higher levels of strategic similarity 
lead to increased rivalry, not less rivalry. 
The counter theoretical view of the relationship between strategic similarity 
and intensity of rivalry is an outgrowth of the Harvard approach to strategic 
groups (Hunt 1972; Porter 1976; Caves and Porter 1977).  In this stream of 
research, strategic distance (the inverse of strategic similarity) is seen as a 
hindrance to inter-firm tacit coordination.  When inter-firm tacit coordination 
fails because of lack of strategic similarity, strong rivalry ensues that eventually 
drives down firm performance.  The less the strategic similarity, other things 
being equal, the more difficult tacit coordination becomes and the more vigorous 
is rivalry likely to be in the industry.  This reasoning has become known as the 
Caves-Porter hypothesis. 
 The hypothesis that strategic similarity leads to reduced rivalry has been 
subject to major caveats and challenges.  Even Porter (1976) warned that 
strategic similarity per se does not have a determinant effect on rivalry because 
increased strategic similarity is often associated with increased market  
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interdependence (the product offerings of the firms are closer substitutes).  Such 
reasoning agrees with the predictions of industrial organization (IO) models of 
product differentiation (Hotelling 1929; Beath and Katsoulakos 1991), which 
suggest that a critical advantage of product differentiation is the relaxation of 
price competition (D‟Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse 1979).  Thus, 
strategic similarity in intra-market positioning could actually be associated with 
more intense rivalry in that the effect of lack of product differential outweighs 
the effect of increased coordination.   
A study of gasoline prices by Shepard (1991) evaluated price dispersion and 
price discrimination in the context of two groups of gasoline retailers; full-
service and low-service, as well as consumer heterogeneity related to differences 
in consumers‟ willingness to pay.  She found that price dispersion can occur in 
multi-firm markets due to full-service gasoline retailers having sufficient local 
market power to allow them to price discriminate, maintaining price differentials 
approximately twice as large as the differential at low-service gasoline retailers.  
This implies that strategic dissimilarity among competing firms will likely 
increase price dispersion and that network airlines in a market should have 
greater price dispersion than in markets served only by low-fare airlines. 
Gimeno and Woo (1996) studied the effects of multi-market contact and 
strategic similarity on intensity of rivalry in the airline industry.  Gimeno and 
Woo perform an empirical analysis of over 3,000 city-pair markets in the U.S. 
airline industry.  They focused on the effects of changes in strategic similarity in 
a city-pair market on the prices charged by airlines in that market.  Other  
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important factors which influence prices, such as service attributes, market 
characteristics, cost positions, market structure and firm-specific advantages, 
were rigorously controlled.  Their findings support the hypothesis that strategic 
similarity will increase the intensity of rivalry experienced by a firm, which in 
turn leads to less price dispersion.  These empirical studies in support of the 
research on hyper-competition and product differentiation lead to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H2: The degree of strategic similarity among firms in a local  
market is negatively related to price dispersion in the local market. 
 
Note: The smaller the STS value, the more airlines of dissimilar strategy are 
competing on the route and as a result, price dispersion is expected to be 
larger. 
 
Market Concentration within a Local Market  
Market concentration is the degree of dominance of firms selling similar 
products within a specific market.  The number of firms in a market and the 
market share distribution has long been viewed as an indicator of rivalry and 
profitability by industrial organization (IO) economists.  Greater concentration 
of market share provides the dominant firms market power.  In the extreme case 
of concentration, a single firm totally dominates the market.  In this 
monopolistic condition, the firm„s high level of market power typically results in 
higher prices than occur when there is substantial competition in the market.  
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The concept that greater market concentration leads to increased market power 
of dominant firms and resulting in higher prices, has been well documented and 
is one of the main reasons for the U.S. Government monitoring and limiting 
industry concentration.   
Market concentration is typically measured by the Herfindahl index (also 
referred to as the Herfindahl-Hirshman index), which is the market share for 
each firm competing within a market, squared.  Market concentration is one of 
the independent variables applied by Borenstein and Rose (1994), Hayes and 
Ross (1998), and Zhao (2006) to evaluate the causes of price dispersion.  In the 
Borenstein and Rose (1994) study, the Herfindahl index was calculated based on 
the number of flights of specific flights on a given city-pair route, which they 
then applied to evaluate price dispersion among airline passengers on a limited 
number of routes.  Hayes and Ross (1998) calculated the Herfindahl index based 
on the number of passengers served by airlines within the terminal.  They used 
this measure of market concentration to evaluate price dispersion.   Zhao (2006) 
calculated the Herfindahl index based on the sales of brands of specific product 
categories, which she then applied to evaluate price dispersion among airline 
passengers on a limited number of routes.  All three of these studies found the 
expected result that price dispersion is inversely related to concentration.  
Simply stated, the more concentrated the market, price dispersion tends to be 
reduced. 
In this study, the city-pair route is the sub-market of interest and therefore, 
concentration of airlines is calculated using the Herfindahl index methodology  
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on each city-pair route.  The following hypothesis reflects the expected and 
important inverse relationship between market concentration (city-pair routes in 
this study) and price dispersion. 
 
H3: The degree of market concentration in a local market is  
negatively related to price dispersion in the local market. 
 
Market Size  
Market size has been measured in several ways, such as the number of 
customers or sales volume (monetary value or units sold).  In this current study, 
market size is the volume of passengers on a city-pair route relative to the most 
frequently traveled route.  In essence, market size measures how many 
passengers travel on the route, regardless of the number of airlines on the route. 
Stigler‟s (1961) classic, conceptual article on price dispersion briefly 
discussed market size as a potential source of price dispersion.  He made the 
point that as markets grow, there is a greater likelihood of there being a common 
source for the collection and selling of information (e.g., trade journal of 
specialized broker).  If this information includes price data, increased 
availability of information should reduce price dispersion.  By applying this 
rationale to this study, it seems logical that in larger markets where there are 
more customers, there is a greater incentive to provide information to customer 
about the choices (including prices) that are available, thereby encouraging 
firms to compete more aggressively on price, which should reduce price 
dispersion. 
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In Borenstein and Rose‟s (1994) study, they measured market size (referred 
to as market density) by the total number of flights on the route.  Borenstein and 
Rose found that in larger markets, there is less price dispersion.  This finding is 
consistent with models of monopolistic competitive price discrimination 
(Borenstein, 1985; Holmes, 1989), as well as this current study.  The rationale of 
this finding is that in larger markets there are more customers, who increase the 
competitive pressure on the airlines, resulting in less price dispersion.   
Gimeno and Woo (1996) studied the U.S. airline industry with the focus on 
variables that might affect the yield (i.e., fare divided by route distance).  They 
evaluated several passenger density variables.  One of those passenger density 
variables measured market size of hubs.  Gimeno and Woo found hub density to 
be positive related to yield.  Higher levels of yield result in higher average 
prices, which some prior research (e.g., Ancarani and Shankar 2004; Xing, 
Yang, and Tang 2006) has shown to result in larger price dispersion.  This 
rationale is based on the reasoning that larger markets attract more airlines, 
which are likely to result in greater variation in prices.  This rationale is counter 
to the expectation of market size in this study and may be due the measurement 
of passengers at the hub airport rather than the city-pair route.  However, the 
results of Gimeno and Woo‟s study lend support to the hypothesis regarding 
hubs (hypothesis 6 below) of this study. 
Borenstein and Rose found larger market size to lower individual airlines‟ 
price dispersion.  This is counter to the Gimeno and Woo results, which may 
have been due to Gimeno and Woo‟s measurement of market size and may be  
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correct for price dispersion at hub airports.  Fundamentally, the differences in 
the outcomes of these studies may lie in who has greater market power, the 
sellers or the buyers.  If the sellers have more power, there is greater price 
dispersion.  Conversely, if the buyers have more power, there is less price 
dispersion.  In the case of the airline ticket market, in larger markets, the 
consumers seem to have more power and therefore, price dispersion tends to 
decrease. 
The Borenstein and Rose study is more similar to the situation in this 
current study and therefore greater market size is expected to decrease price 
dispersion.  Stigler‟s rationale and Borenstein and Rose‟s findings support the 
hypothesis that market size will increase the intensity of rivalry experienced by a 
firm.  These empirical studies and this rationale support the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H4: The size of the local market is negatively related to price dispersion in  
the local market. 
 
Route Distance   
Route distance is the linear distance between the cities at each end of the city-
pair route.  This variable was applied as an independent variable by several 
researchers (e.g., Borentstein 1989; Evans and Kessides 1994; Hayes and Ross 
1998) to evaluate pricing related dependent variables.  Borentstein (1989) 
evaluated the importance of route and airport related variables on price levels on 
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airline routes.  One of the route variables is route distance and they found route 
distance to be positively related to the price level on city-pair routes.   
Evans and Kessides (1994) also studied the effects of numerous variables 
including route distance on price levels on airline routes.  Their finding was that 
route distance is positively related to the price level on city-pair routes.  Route 
distance was applied by Hayes and Ross (1998) to evaluate the causes of price 
dispersion and scaled route distance.  Their research found that dispersion is 
greater on longer route distances. This leads to the following hypotheses that on 
longer route distances there tends to be greater price dispersion.   
 
H5: The distance of a city-pair route is positively related to price dispersion 
on the route. 
 
Hub Airport  
In 1978, the U.S. Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act, which 
transformed the domestic airline industry from extensive government regulation 
to a new era of competition (Nannes 2000).  Airlines were permitted to enter and 
leave domestic markets without government authorization and to set prices and 
conditions of service.  These actions would be subject to antitrust laws, the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) retained jurisdiction over mergers and acquisitions 
and its authority to prohibit unfair practices. 
 Prior to the Airline Deregulation Act, carriers largely provided point-to 
point service.  Following deregulation, the airlines began to consolidate their 
operations at specific airports, forming what came to be known as hubs.  A 
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“hub” airline combines “local” passengers (i.e., those originating at or destined 
to the hub) with “connecting” passengers (i.e., those passing through the hub) on 
the same flight.  The approach, referred to as hub-and-spoke, allows “hub” 
airlines to serve more cities from their hubs (known as spoke routes) and offer 
greater frequency of service with its aircraft than had been possible with point-
to-point service. 
 Notwithstanding the benefits, the dominance of spoke routes by hub airlines 
raises concern about the exercise of market power on those routes.  Research has 
shown that airlines can and do charge higher prices on routes connected to hubs 
than on non-hub routes where they face more competition.  Hub control is a 
measure of market power (Borenstein 1989).  Borenstein found that airlines had 
greater market power in their hubs and as result, price levels were higher and 
price dispersion was less on routes.  In the current study, the focus is on price 
dispersion that occurs on the city-pair route for all of the airlines in the study 
and not the pricing of individual airlines, as is the case with Borenstein (1989).  
Hayes and Ross (1998) applied this variable and found that price dispersion was 
less in hub airports than in non-hub airports.  This leads to the following 
hypotheses that less price dispersion is expected at hub routes.   
 
H6:  When a city-pair route is connected to a hub airport, there is a negative  
effect on price dispersion on the route. 
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Multi-Market Contact and Strategic Similarity Interaction 
The effect of multi-market contact on price dispersion is expected to be 
 moderated by strategic similarity.  Strategic management literature that is based 
on the Harvard approach to strategic groups (Hunt 1972; Porter 1976; Caves and 
Porter 1977) argues that strategically similar firms tend to compete less 
aggressively.  A common rationale as implied by Caves and Porter (1977) is that 
firms that are structurally similar lead these firms to recognize their 
interdependencies and anticipate their tactical moves, allowing tacit collusion.  
Conversely, strategically dissimilar firms require more information and more 
accuracy to achieve the same level of tacit collusion as the strategically similar 
firms.  Researchers have found evidence of this collusive behavior between 
strategically similar firms (e.g., Peteraf 1993b, Young, Smith, Grimm, and 
Simon 2000). 
 Based on the arguments of the Harvard approach, Young, Smith, Grimm, 
and Simon 2000 consider multi-market contact and strategic similarity as 
alternative means of gaining information that facilitates mutually beneficial 
cooperation.  Therefore, in relationships between firms with high levels of 
strategic similarity in a market, the impact of multi-market contact is small 
given that the strategic similarity provides sufficient mutual forbearance to 
encourage cooperation as reduced competitiveness.  Conversely, the reduction in 
informational exchange between strategically dissimilar firms would increase 
the influence of multi-market contact.  
 Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2006) studied the influence of multi-market contact 
and strategic similarity on market entry decisions in the Spanish banking market.  
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One of the interactions evaluated in their study is the effect of multi-market 
contact on mutual forbearance when considering differences in strategic 
similarity between rival firms.  Fuentelsaz and Gomez (p. 491) determined that 
“the effect of multi-market contact on mutual forbearance becomes more intense 
(lower entry rates) as multi-market rivals are [more] strategically dissimilar” 
(i.e., less strategically similar).  Stated more simply, they found that increasing 
multi-market contact lowers market entry rates when rivals are less similar.  
Lower entry rates indicate less interest in competing in markets where a strong, 
competitive retaliation by incumbent firms with different strategies is 
anticipated.   
 Prior research on multi-market contact shows that as competitive pressure 
among rival firms is reduced, price dispersion increases.  Therefore, in the 
context of price dispersion, it is predicted that when the degree of strategic 
similarity between competing firms is greater, multi-market contact has a greater 
effect on price dispersion.  The following hypothesis reflects this rationale.   
 
H7:  When the degree of strategic similarity in a market is greater, the effect 
of multi-market contact on price dispersion increases. 
 
Figure 2 (below) is a graphical representation of this hypothesis.  The figure 
shows that at high levels of strategic similarity, multi-market contact has a 
greater effect on price dispersion.  Notice that the „high strategic similarity‟ is 
below the „low strategic similarity‟ line.  When strategic similarity in a market is 
greater („high strategic similarity‟ in the graph), the effect of multi-market 
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contact on price dispersion is greater than when strategic similarity is less („low 
strategic similarity‟ in the graph), as stated in the hypothesis. 
 
Figure 2 – Graphical Representation of H7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multi-Market Contact and Market Concentration Interaction 
The effect of multi-market contact on price dispersion is also expected to be 
moderated by market concentration (Jayachandran, Gimeno, and Vanadarajan 
1999).  The market share distribution (i.e., market concentration) of firms 
competing in a market has been shown to indicate intensity of rivalry, price 
levels, and profitability by industrial organization (IO) economists (Fuentelsaz 
and Gomez 2006).  Based on this research and other research focused on price 
dispersion, market concentration is expected to be an influencing factor on price 
dispersion, as explained in the main effect hypothesis (H3, above) that relates to 
market concentration.  The effect that market concentration can have on mutual 
forbearance and tacit collusion has also been explained in prior multi-market 
contact literature, which emphasizes its moderating influence.   
Price 
Dispersion 
Multi-Market Contact 
Low Strategic Similarity 
High Strategic Similarity 
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 Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2006) hypothesized that the effect of multi-market 
contact on mutual forbearance would decrease in more concentrated markets.    
In the price dispersion context, it is predicted that when there is greater 
concentration of the firms in a market, the effect of multi-market contact on 
price dispersion is reduced.  The following hypothesis reflects this rationale.   
 
H8:  When market concentration is greater, the effect of multi-market  
contact on price dispersion decreases. 
 
Figure 3 (below) is a graphical representation of this hypothesis.  The figure 
shows that at high levels of market concentration, multi-market contact has a 
lesser effect on price dispersion.  Notice that the „high market concentration‟ is 
below the „low market concentration‟ line.  When market concentration in a 
market is greater („high market concentration‟ in the graph), the effect of multi-
market contact on price dispersion is less than when market concentration is less 
(„low market concentration‟ in the graph), as stated in the hypothesis. 
 
Figure 3 – Graphical Representation of H8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Price 
Dispersion 
Multi-Market Contact 
Low Market Concentration 
High Market Concentration 
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Strategic Similarity and Market Concentration Interaction 
After an extensive review of relevant literature, the author is not aware of any 
research on the interaction of strategic similarity and market concentration.  
Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2006) studied the effect on price dispersion of two 
related interactions; multi-market contact with strategic similarity and multi-
market contact with concentration, but they did not study the interaction of 
strategic similarity and market concentration.  However, this would be a logical 
consideration given these two interactions evaluated by Fuentelsaz and Gomez.  
Similar to the rationale for multi-market contact, the effect of strategic similarity 
on price dispersion is expected to be moderated by market concentration.   
As stated previously, market concentration has been shown to indicate 
intensity of rivalry, price levels, and profitability by economists, and is expected 
to influence price dispersion.  Since strategic similarity and multi-market contact 
are considered alternative means of explaining mutually beneficial cooperation 
(i.e., mutual forbearance) (Young, Smith, Grimm, and Simon 2000), it is a 
reasonable expectation that market concentration will moderate strategic 
similarity‟s affect on price dispersion in a comparable, although opposite in 
direction, manner, as it moderates multi-market contact. For this reason, it is 
predicted that in markets where there is greater market concentration, the effect 
of strategic similarity on price dispersion increases.  The following hypothesis 
reflects this rationale.   
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H9:  When market concentration is greater, the effect of strategic similarity  
on price dispersion increases.  
 
Figure 4 (below) is a graphical representation of this hypothesis.  The figure 
shows that at high levels of market concentration, strategic similarity has a 
greater effect (i.e., more negative) on price dispersion. Notice that the „high 
market concentration‟ is below the „low market concentration‟ line.  When 
market concentration in a market is greater („high market concentration‟ in the 
graph), the effect of strategic similarity on price dispersion is less than when 
market concentration is less („low market concentration‟ in the graph), as stated 
in the hypothesis. 
 
Figure 4 – Graphical Representation of H9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Price 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY & DATA 
This chapter begins by presenting background on the U.S. airline industry.  
Then, the data used for testing the hypotheses are discussed.  This is followed by 
the empirical model and a description of each of the variables and the method of 
calculation.  Finally, multiple regression, the multivariate analysis technique 
applied to evaluate the variables in this study, is discussed.  
U. S. Airline Industry  
The airline industry in the U.S. is a relatively new industry, dating back to the 
early twentieth century.  The Civil Aeronautics Board was created in 1938 to 
regulate the airline industry and it existed until 1984.  The airline industry was a 
heavily regulated industry until 1978 when the U.S. government “deregulated” 
(i.e., dramatically reduced regulations) the airline industry.  These reduced 
regulations resulted in greater price competition and the creation of the hub-and-
spoke system (Rubin and Joy 2005). 
 The airline market is characterized by an oligopoly market structure, a form 
of imperfect competition in which a limited number of firms dominate the 
industry (Rubin and Joy 2005).  Oligopoly firms have market power in setting 
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prices for their products.  Firms in oligopoly market structures may produce 
homogeneous or heterogeneous products.  Airlines competing in the airline 
market produce homogeneous products and competitors readily know their 
prices.  Therefore, the airlines are interdependent and recognize that their market 
power is vulnerable to erosion by competitors. 
Data Description 
The data used in this study are from the Origin and Destination Survey of Air 
Passenger Traffic.  The Origin and Destination database consists of a 10% 
random sample of all airline passenger tickets issued by all airlines on a 
quarterly basis.  This study focuses on routes of seven network and ten low-fare 
airlines during the first quarter of 1999.  Data are available for each city-pair 
route.  For cities with multiple airports, the data are at the airport level.  
 The data set consists of several, very large spreadsheets of data.  One 
spreadsheet contains average prices paid by consumers for each city-pair route 
and each airline on the route on a quarterly basis.  There are approximately 
38,000 rows of data.  There are approximately 7,000 city-pair routes in the U.S. 
in this data set.  In this study, only the routes with two or more airlines on a 
route are included.  As a result, 5,974 routes are included in this study.  The 
range of airlines on a route is from one to twelve with an average of 5.4 airlines 
per route. 
A second spreadsheet contains the number of passengers that purchased 
tickets for each city-pair route and each airline on the route on a quarterly basis 
in the same format as the first spreadsheet.  There are approximately 38,000 
rows of data.  A third spreadsheet contains the route distances for each city-pair 
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route.  These spreadsheet contain the data that is used in this study to evaluate 
the effects of competition and market structure on price dispersion. 
Method – Multiple Regression 
Multiple regression analysis is applied in this study since it is the appropriate 
method of analysis when the research problem involves a single, metric 
dependent variable believed to be related to two or more independent variables 
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black 1998); with some of the independent 
variables being metric.  In this study, the dependent variable is price dispersion 
and the independent variables are shown in the model and described below.  
Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black identify four major assumptions underlying 
multiple regression; (1) linearity of the phenomenon being measured, (2) 
constant variance of the error terms, (3) independence of the error terms, and (4) 
normality of the error distribution.  “The principal measure of prediction error 
for the variate is the residual---the difference between the observed and 
predicted values for the dependent variable (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black 
1998, p. 172).  
1. Linearity of the phenomenon represents the degree to which the change in 
the dependent variable is related to change in independent variable.  In 
order to examine the effect of an individual independent variable on the 
dependent variable, partial regression plots can be performed.  There are 
numerous mathematical techniques (e.g., logarithms) that can be applied to 
linearize non-linear relationships between variables.  
In multiple regression, an examination of the residuals shows the 
combined effects of all independent variables, and therefore, the effect of 
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individual independent variables cannot be examined.  To do this, partial 
regression plots are used to show the relationship of a single independent 
variable to the dependent variable.  In the partial regression plots, a 
curvilinear pattern of residuals indicates a nonlinear relationship between 
the independent variable and the dependent variable.  Also, evaluating one 
independent variable at a time facilitates the identification of outliers or 
influential observations. 
2. Constant variance of the error terms means that the variance of the error 
terms is uniform over the range of values of the variables in the analysis.  
Heteroscedasticity occurs when the residual variance varies with the values 
of an independent variable.  This can be detected when examining residual 
plots.  If the distribution of residuals is uniform as the value of the 
independent variable changes, then there is little or no heteroscedasticity, 
also called homoscedasticity.  On the other hand, if the distribution of 
residuals is not uniform as the value of the independent variable changes, 
then there is heteroscedasticity.  The less uniform that the distribution is, the 
greater the heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity weakens the predictive 
capability of a regression model (Wang and Akabay 1994).   
The three most common causes of heteroscedasticity are (Wang and 
Akabay 1994): 
a. Where the database of one or more independent variables contains a 
large range of values. 
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b. Where the parity between the growth rate of dependent variables and 
independent variables varies appreciably during the modeling 
process.  This is only applicable to time series data. 
c. Where there exists heterogeneity in the data.  This is more likely to 
occur with cross-sectional data than with time series.  As an example, 
data of price levels on different routes will not likely be uniform.  If 
such data were pooled together in regression modeling using the OLS 
(ordinary least squares) method, the problem of heteroscedasticity 
would arise.  In estimating the coefficients of the model, the OLS 
method gives equal weight to each data point, resulting in 
heteroscedasticity. 
According to Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black 1998 (p. 174), “the 
presence of unequal variances (i.e., heteroscedasticity) is one of the most 
common assumption violations”.  Two possible remedies for 
heteroscedasticity are available.  If the problem occurs with a single 
independent variable, the procedure of weighted least squares can be 
employed.  If the problem is more general, variance-stabilizing 
transformations can be performed on the independent variables. 
3. Independence of the error terms - It is assumed in regression that each 
predicted value is independent.  In other words, individual predicted values 
are not sequenced by any variable.  Violations of this assumption are 
identified by a consistent pattern in the residuals, for example, a shift in 
residuals due to changes in season when there is no seasonality variable.  
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Data transformations, such as inclusion of independent variables to tackle 
the shift in residuals, can fix this problem. 
4. Normality of the error distribution - Non-normality of the error term can be 
identified by a visual check for normal distribution of a histogram of the 
residuals or normal probability plots.  If non-normality of the error term 
exists, transformations can be performed on the independent variables to 
improve normality. 
Multicollinearity and Multiple Regression 
Multicollinearity is the “extent to which a variable can be explained by the other 
variables in the analysis.  As muticollinearity increases, it complicates the 
interpretation of the variate as it is more difficult to ascertain the effect of any 
single variable owing to the interrelationships” (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and 
Black 1998, p. 2).  “Multicollinearity represents the degree to which any 
variable‟s effect can be predicted or accounted for by the other variables in the 
analysis.  As muticollinearity rises, the ability to define any variable‟s effect is 
diminished” (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black 1998, p. 24).   
Multicollinearity occurs when intercorrelations among the independent 
variables are very high (Malhotra 1999, p. 548).  “When multicollinearity is 
present, special care is required in assessing the relative importance of 
independent variables.  In applied marketing research it is valuable to determine 
the relative importance of the [independent variables].  In other words, how 
important are the independent variables in accounting for the variation in the 
dependent variable” (Malhotra 1999, p. 549).  Unfortunately, there is no 
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unambiguous measure.  However, several approaches are commonly used to 
assess the relative importance.     
1. Statistical significance.  If the partial regression coefficient of a variable 
is not significant, as determined by the F test, that variable is judged to 
be unimportant. 
2. Square of the simple correlation coefficient.  The measure, r2, represents 
the proportion of the variation in the dependent variable explained by the 
independent variable in a bivariate relationship. 
3. Square of the partial correlation coefficient.  The measure, R2yxixjxk, is 
the coefficient of determination between the dependent variable and 
independent variable, controlling for the effects of the other independent 
variables. 
4. Square of the part correlation coefficient.  This coefficient represents an 
increase in R
2
 when a variable is entered into a regression equation that 
already contains the other independent variable. 
5. Measures based on standardized coefficients or beta weights.  The most 
commonly used measures are the absolute values of the Beta weights or 
squared values. 
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Empirical Model 
The following equation is the empirical model for the conceptual model 
described above and evaluated in this study. 
 
PRDij = β0 + β1 MMCij + β2 STSij + β3 HHIij + β4 MSZij + β5 DSTij  
+ β6 HUBij  + β7 MMCij x STSij + β8 MMCij x HHIij  
+ β9 STSij x HHIij + εij 
  where; i and j are the city pairs. 
 
PRD = price dispersion 
MMC = multi-market contact 
STS = strategic similarity 
HHI = market concentration 
MSZ = market size 
DST = route distance 
HUB = hub airport 
εij = error term 
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The following Table I briefly describes the dependent variable, price 
dispersion, and each independent variable.  The measurement and type of data 
for each variable is also provided.  All of the variables are metric with the 
exception of hub airport, which is dichotomous.  A detailed explanation of these 
variables follows Table I. 
 
Table I – Variable Measurement and Data Summary 
Variable Measurement Type of Data 
Price Dispersion 
Gini Coefficient                                
(see p. 85-90 for description and 
formula) 
Average Quarterly Price and Average 
Quarterly Number of Passengers on 
Routes and Airlines 
Multi-Market 
Contact 
Multi-Market Contact                                
(see p. 91-92 for description and 
formula) 
Routes and Airlines 
Strategic Similarity 
Level of Strategic Similarity                               
(see p. 92-94 for description and 
formula) 
Airline Classification, Routes, and 
Airlines 
Concentration 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index                               
(see p. 94-95 for description) 
Airline, Route, and Average Quarterly 
Number of Passengers on Routes and 
Airlines 
Market Size 
Number of Passengers on Route 
Relative to Most Traveled Route                               
(see p. 95 for description) 
Average Quarterly Number of 
Passengers on Routes  
Route Distance 
Length of Route Relative to the 
Longest Route                               
(see p. 95 for description) 
Route Distances  
Hub Airport 
Route Connected to Hub = 1, Route 
with No Hub = 0                               
(see p. 95-96 for description) 
Hub Airports 
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Dependent Variable - Price Dispersion 
Economists have been measuring inequalities of factors, such as income and 
price, for decades.  Income inequality was one of the earliest variables to be 
evaluated by economics researchers.  Price inequality (i.e., price dispersion) has 
been given attention by researchers in more recent times. The Gini coefficient, 
which is applied to price dispersion in this current study, was originally 
developed for use in evaluating income equalities across populations of people, 
but Gini is equally effective in evaluating price differences across populations of 
customers. 
Price dispersion has been measured in many ways.  Some of the ways price 
dispersion has been measured are; the Gini coefficient (e.g., Borenstein and 
Rose 1994; Hayes and Ross 1998; Restuccia and Urrutia 2001), range (e.g., 
Stigler 1961, Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000), trimmed range (e.g., Brynjolfsson 
and Smith 2000), standard deviation (e.g., Stigler 1961; Brynjolfsson and Smith 
2000), coefficient of variation (e.g., Zhoa 2006), the Atkinson measure (e.g., 
Hayes and Ross 1998), the entropy index (e.g., Hayes and Ross 1998), kernel 
density plots (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000), and percentage gap (e.g. 
Baye, Morgan, and Scholten 2004).   
The Gini coefficient measures the degree of inequality of a variable in a 
distribution of its elements (Rodrique, Comtois, and Slack 2009).  The Gini 
coefficient has been selected as the measure of price dispersion in this current 
study because it has been shown to be very effective in evaluating price 
dispersion in studies by Borenstein and Rose 1994; Hayes and Ross 1998; 
Restuccia and Urrutia 2001.  Other similar measures have produced similar 
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results (e.g., Restuccia and Urrutia 2001) supporting the validity of the Gini 
coefficient as a measure of price dispersion.  As explained by Borenstein and 
Rose (1994, p. 656), “Multiplying the Gini coefficient by two gives the expected 
absolute difference in prices as a proportion for the mean price for two 
customers drawn at random for a population.  A Gini of 0.10 therefore implies 
an expected absolute price difference of 20 percent of the mean fare”. 
Gini is calculated from the average price charged to customers by each 
airline for each city-pair route per quarter.  The Gini coefficient (also referred to 
as Gini index or Gini ratio) is the most widely used statistical measure of income 
inequity and is derived from the Lorenz curve (Abounoori and McCloughnan 
2003).  When used to evaluate income inequalities, the Lorenz curve is a 
function of the cumulative proportion of income receivers relative to the 
corresponding cumulative proportion of income received.  When applied to 
price dispersion, the Lorenz curve is a function the cumulative proportion of 
price payers (i.e., consumers) relative to the corresponding cumulative 
proportion of prices paid.   
When an equation for the Lorenz curve can be derived, integration can 
be applied to calculate the relative proportion of the area between the straight, 
45-degree line (i.e.; perfect equality) and the Lorenz curve.  The Gini coefficient 
is a positive index of inequality, with values closer to unity associated with 
higher inequality.  The Gini coefficient is expressed as (Abounoori and 
McCloughan, 2003, p. 505):   
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 G = 1 – 2  ∫0
1
  l(z)dz 
where z in the context of price dispersion is the cumulative proportion 
of price payers (i.e., customers) and l is the corresponding cumulative 
proportion of prices paid.  
 
Figure 5 provides and example of the Gini coefficient measurement of price 
dispersion.  The Gini coefficient is based on comparing the cumulative share of 
price paid (vertical axis) relative to the cumulative share of passengers 
(horizontal axis).  The curved line is a graphical representation of price 
dispersion.  The area between the curved line and the 45
o
 is the Gini coefficient; 
in this case 0.36.  When there is less price dispersion, the Gini coefficient 
decreases and the price dispersion line approaches the 45
o
 line. When there is 
more price dispersion, the Gini coefficient increases and the price dispersion line 
approaches the lower right corner. 
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Figure 5 – Gini Coefficient Example 
 
However, with most large amounts of discrete data, such as the prices paid 
for airline tickets by customers, the Lorenz curve is a series of straight lines and 
several methods to accurately calculate the Gini coefficient have been developed 
(e.g., Lorenz 1905; Pyatt, Chen, and Fei 1980; Corwell 1995; Milanovic 1994, 
1997).  An article by Abounoori and McCloughan (2000) evaluates methods of 
calculating the Gini coefficient from both grouped and ungrouped data.  
Abounoori and McCloughan determined that the most accurate method for 
calculating the Gini coefficient from grouped data is the Malanovic (1994) 
method, which is applied in this research.  See Abounoori and McCloughan, 
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2003, p. 507, equation 13 for calculating Gini for grouped data.  Table 3 (p. 508) 
in the Abounoori and McCloughan articles shows an example of the Malanovic 
(1994) method.  
The Gini coefficient is superior in this application to the other measures of 
inequality mentioned above, due to its inclusion of the measurement of non-
normal (and non-uniform) distributions and the potential for calculated values to 
be continuous, range from zero to one, and ratio data.  A value of zero value 
occurs when these is uniform prices, which means that there is zero price 
dispersion.  The value of zero is referred to as „perfect equality‟ and occurs on 
one route in this data set when there are two airlines with identical average 
prices.  The value of one is referred to as „perfect inequality‟ and does not 
actually occur because it would mean that all passengers except on pays nothing 
and one passenger pays something.  In this data set, the largest Gini coefficient 
is 0.467. 
A few other studies have applied standard deviation (e.g., Brynholfsson and 
Smith (2000) and Ancarani and Shankar (2004)).  These studies are focused on 
comparing price dispersion of Internet retailers to traditional brick-and-mortar 
retails with the product typically being books or CDs.  An underlying 
assumption in applying standard deviation to price dispersion is that the prices 
are normally distributed.  In the case of the airline prices in this study, prices are 
typically not uniformly distributed.   
Another measure of inequality based on the standard deviation that has been 
applied to evaluate price dispersion is the coefficient of variation (Zhao 2006).   
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One of the benefits of using the standard deviation and coefficient of variation is 
the ease of calculation compared to calculation the Gini coefficient.  However, it 
has some limitations and with current computational technology, it is possible to 
calculate the Gini coefficient for large data sets in a reasonable time.   
A major limitation of applying standard deviation and coefficient of 
variation to price dispersion in some applications is the lack of comparable 
reference from one situation to another, as in the case of airline routes.  Unlike 
the price of a specific book or a specific CD, the standard deviation from one 
route to another is often quite different, thereby precluding a simple direct 
comparison between the two routes.  In contrast, the Gini coefficient is directly 
comparable from one route to another because it is calculated on the basis of the 
difference between the cumulative share of passengers and the cumulative share 
of prices paid to the line of „perfect equality‟.   
Independent Variables 
The following is a description and calculation method for each of the 
independent (i.e., predictor) variables applied in this study.  
Multi-market contact is a measure of the potential for strategic market 
encounters between airlines (Baum and Korn 1996).  Baum and Korn (1996) 
developed a methodology for evaluating the level of competition between firms 
that compete in many different local markets.  In an earlier study, Evans and 
Kessides (1994) used average route contact as their measure of multi-market 
contact, resulting in values from 0 to over 400.  Baum and Korn‟s methodology 
is based on calculating (for only the firms competing in a sub-market) the 
number of other sub-markets where the firms compete and then divides this 
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number by the maximum number of potential sub-markets where the firms could 
compete.  The range of values for the Baum and Korn approach to measuring 
multi-market contact is zero to one.  This study applies the Baum and Korn 
methodology.   
The multi-market contact for firm i in a focal market m is measured using 
the number of contacts that firm i has with the competitors in market m 
competing in markets different from focus market m at time t as follows: 
 
MMCint = [Σj≠i Σm (Dimt x Djmt)] / [Σm Dimt x NMMCt], for all j Σm (Dimt x 
Djmt)] > 1 
  
where;  Dimt is an indicator variable set equal to one it firm i  is active in a 
market m at time t and to zero otherwise.   
N is the number of firms j that contact the focal firm i in market m 
that are multi-market contacts (i.e., that firm i encounters in at least 
one market other than m) and all other terms are as defined above.  
  
As stated above, the range of values of multi-market contact using the 
Baum and Korn approach is zero to one.  Multi-market contact can vary from 
zero, when there is no multi-market contact, to one, when firm i engages all 
other firms in market m in all of M in its own markets.  Given that similar 
indices have been previously used (e.g., Baum and Korn 1996, Gimeno and 
Woo 1996, Young, Smith, Grimm, and Simon 2000; Fuentelsaz and Gomez 
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2006), this approach to measuring multi-market contact provides the possibility 
of comparing the results of this study with those of the earlier studies. 
Strategic similarity is the average of strategic similarity/dissimilarity 
categorizations between firm i with every competitor j in the focus market (i.e., 
sub-market) m.   Strategic similarity at the firm level is zero or one, a 
dichotomous variable.  Following the methodology applied by Gimeno and Woo 
(1996), if the airlines are of the same classifications, their strategy is expected to 
be similar and the two competing airlines (within a specific city-pair route) are 
given a value of one.  The one applies to either network-to-network airlines or 
low-fare-to-low-fare airlines.  When the two airlines are of different 
classifications (i.e., different strategies), the value is zero.  Strategic similarity is 
calculated by taking the average of airline pairings of similar and dissimilar 
strategies.  The larger the strategic similarity value, the more airlines of similar 
strategy are competing on a route.  The methodology applied in this study is also 
similar to Shepard‟s (1991) study in that she separated gasoline retailers into two 
groups; full-service and low-service retailers. 
The operationalization of strategic similarity follows the discrete 
classification scheme used by the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
(BTS), which classifies airlines as; (1) network (i.e., national, full in-flight 
service), such as American Airline, (2) low-cost (i.e., low fare with limited 
routes and limited in-flight service), such as Southwest Airline, and (3) regional.  
In this study, two major groups of airlines are evaluated; network (also referred  
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to as legacy airlines) and low-fare airlines (also referred to as low-cost or 
discount airlines).   
Airlines with the same BTS classification are likely to be strategically 
similar in their intra-market positioning, which should influence the intensity of 
their rivalry.  Hence, 
 
Strategic similarityij =  1 if firms (e.g., airlines) i and j have the 
same BTS classifications, 
0 if firms i and j have different BTS 
classifications. 
 
 Because the intensity of rivalry experienced by a firm in a market is 
affected by the rivalry with all competitors in the market, the effect of strategic 
similarity to those competitors is aggregated by calculating the average strategic 
similarity between all firms j in market m (Gimeno and Woo 1996).  If total 
competitive pairsimt represents the number of competitive pairs of firms 
competing in market m at time t, the aggregate measures of strategic similarity 
in a market m are calculated as follows. 
 
STSmt = [∑ strategic similarityijmt] / total competitive pairsijmt 
 
Strategic similarity can vary from zero, where there is no strategic similarity 
(e.g., two dissimilar firms competing in a market), to one, when all of the 
competing firms in a market are strategically similar (e.g., all network airlines or 
all low-fare airlines).  
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Market concentration is the degree of dominance by firms selling similar 
products within a specific market.  Market concentration is typically measured 
by the Herfindahl index (HHI), which is calculated by squaring the market share 
for each firm (i.e., airline) competing within a market.  In this study, the city-
pair route is the sub-market of interest and therefore, concentration of airlines is 
evaluated on each city-pair route.  The Herfindahl index is calculated using the 
number of passengers per airline on the city-pair route each quarter.   
The Herfindahl index has been applied as an independent variable in many 
studies including Borenstein and Rose (1994) and Hayes and Ross (1998) to 
evaluate the causes of price dispersion in the airline industry.  The Herfindahl 
index can vary from near zero, in a market where there is a very large number of 
firms competing, all with near zero market shares, to one, when there is only one 
firm with 100% market share. 
Market size is the number of passengers on a city-pair route.  Market size 
measures how many passengers travel on the route, regardless of the number of 
airlines on the route.  Gimeno and Woo (1996) studied the U.S. airline industry 
with the focus on variables that might affect the yield (i.e., fare divided by route 
distance).   One of those variables measured passenger volume at the hub.  
Borenstein and Rose (1994) applied a similar independent variable, based on the 
total number of flights.  In this study, market size is calculated by dividing the 
number of passengers on the route by the maximum number of passengers on 
the route with the most passengers on a single city-pair route and can vary from  
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near zero, on a route where there are very few passengers, to one, the route with 
the most passengers. 
Route distance is the linear distance between the cities at each end of the city-
pair route.  Route distances the United States vary from 11 to 2,770 miles.  This 
variable has been applied in a several studies on pricing levels on airline routes 
(e.g., Borentstein 1989; Evans and Kessides 1994).  Hayes and Ross (1998) 
applied this variable to evaluate causes of price dispersion and scaled route 
distance by dividing by 1,000.  In this study, the route distance variable is 
calculated by dividing each city-pair route distance by the longest route distance 
resulting in values from nearly zero to one. 
Hub airport is a zero or one, dichotomous variable, which indicates that an 
airline‟s hub is at one or both ends of the city-pair route.  If neither endpoint is a 
hub, the value is zero and if either or both endpoints are hubs, the value is one.  
Hayes and Ross (1998) applied this variable to evaluate causes of price 
dispersion.  Borenstein (1989) applied this variable and found it to be an 
indicator of market power.   
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
Multiple regression and bivariate correlation are performed on the data from 
5,974 city-pair routes in the United States.  The data in this study are from the 
first quarter of 1999.  The prices, number of passengers and routes of seventeen 
airlines; seven network airlines and ten low-fare airlines, are evaluated in this 
analysis.  The six main effect variables and the three interaction variables 
described in Chapter 4 are evaluated. 
Multicollinearity between Multi-Market Contact and Strategic Similarity 
In Table II, the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables of interest is 
presented.  The correlation analysis of the main effect variables shows a high 
correlation (0.81) between multi-market contact and strategic similarity.  As 
explained previously (p. 76), high levels of multicollinearity between 
independent variables is an important concern because it reduces the clarity of 
interpretation of the effect of the independent variables involved on the 
dependent variable.   
  
 95 
 
 
Table II also shows the correlation between multi-market contact and price 
dispersion to be greater that the correlation between strategic similarity and 
price dispersion.  The correlation values indicate that multi-market contact has 
more influence on price dispersion that strategic similarity.  Although 
correlations are not the same as regression coefficients, it does indicate the 
superiority of multi-market contact over strategic similarity, which is supported 
by the regression analysis, which is discussed in detail below. 
Table II – Correlation Matrix (n = 5,974) 
 Correlation Coefficients 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Price Dispersion      
(2) Multi-Market Contact 0.08     
(3) Strategic Similarity 0.05 0.81    
(4) Market Concentration -0.43 0.14 0.07   
(5) Market Size -0.13 -0.29 -0.21 0.01  
(6) Distance 0.32 0.10 0.02 -0.37 -0.09 
 
There are several suggested methods for resolving multicollinearity 
problems (Wang 1996).  The choice of the remedial method depends on the 
circumstances of the analysis.  It was determined through analysis that by 
eliminating either strategic similarity or multi-market contact would reduce the 
highest correlation from 0.81 to 0.37.  Appendix 3 provides a detailed 
comparison of the hypothesized model and two versions of a revised model; one 
without the strategic similarity variable and the other without multi-market 
contact.  The bottom row of Appendix 3 shows that adjusted R
2
 for each of the 
three models.  The adjusted R
2
 (refer to as the adjusted coefficient of 
determination) indicates the proportion of variance explained by the independent 
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variables.  The larger the adjusted R
2
 value, the greater the explanatory power of 
the regression equation, and the better the regression equation is at predicting 
the dependent variable.  By eliminating strategic similarity and the related 
interactions from the model, the adjusted R
2
 only decreased by 0.006 (0.248 to 
0.242).   By contrast, eliminating multi-market contact and the related 
interactions from the model, the adjusted R
2
 decreased by 0.014 (0.248 to 
0.234).  This comparison shows that the model with multi-market contact 
explains more about the competitive causes of price dispersion than the model 
with strategic similarity. 
An evaluation using a holdout sample was also conducted. The results are 
shown in Table III below.  The holdout analysis was conducted by separating 
the data into two sets of an equal number of observations.  One set, referred to as 
the estimation sample is used to evaluate each of the three models shown in 
Appendix 3.  The second set, referred to as the validation set, is used to compare 
to the first set.  The adjusted R
2
 is shown for each of the three models using 
three sets of data; the full data set previously discussed and the two half sets 
used in this holdout evaluation.  Although each provides different results, an 
important overall observation is that the simplified model (with multi-market 
contact) performs better than the simplified model (with strategic similarity).  
This adds to the evidence that the simplified model (with multi-market contact) 
is preferable to the simplified model (with strategic similarity).    
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Table III – Holdout Sample Evaluation 
 
Adjusted R
2
 
Model 
Full Data 
Set 
Change 
from Full 
Model 
Estimation 
Sample 
Change 
from Full 
Model 
Validation 
Sample  
Change 
from Full 
Model 
Full model - 
hypothesized 
0.248 --- 0.265 --- 0.230 --- 
Simplified model 
(with MMC) 
0.242 -2.4% 0.258 -2.6% 0.227 -1.3% 
Simplified model 
(with STS) 
0.234 -5.6% 0.248 -6.4% 0.220 -4.3% 
 
 
Therefore, since similarity and the related interactions were not contributing 
much to the model, and after a thorough evaluation and thoughtful 
consideration, strategic similarity and the related interactions were dropped from 
the model in the interest of providing clarity of the influence of the remaining 
independent variables on price dispersion.  It is also noteworthy that the beta 
values and coefficient estimates for multi-market contact and the interaction of 
multi-market contact and market concentration are much larger that the beta 
values and coefficient estimates for strategic similarity and the interaction of 
strategic similarity and market concentration.  The rest of the discussion of 
results is based on a revised model that does not include strategic similarity or 
the related interaction terms.   
Multiple Regression Diagnostics 
As mentioned earlier in this study, there are four major assumptions underlying 
multiple regression; (1) linearity of the phenomenon being measured,  
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(2) constant variance of the error terms, (3) independence of the error terms, and 
(4) normality of the error distribution.  The following briefly discusses the 
evaluation of multiple regression assumptions: 
1. Linearity of the phenomenon was evaluated by reviewing partial regression 
plots.  Partial regression plots are graphs that show the relationship between 
each of the independent variables and the dependent variable, and resulting 
residuals.  A uniform distribution of residuals indicates a linear relationship. 
This review of partial regression plots indicated that a linear relationship 
exists between the dependent variable and each of the independent 
variables. 
2. Constant variance of the error terms evaluated by examining residual plots. 
Residual plots are graphs that show the residuals relative to the values of the 
predicted dependent variable.  A uniform distribution of residuals indicates 
homoscedasticity (i.e., uniform variance).   The distribution of residuals is 
relatively uniform as the value of the dependent variable changes, indicating 
that there is little or no heteroscedasticity.   
3. Independence of the error terms evaluated by examining residual plots.   
When the residuals are independent, the pattern of the plot appears random.  
There was no indication of individual predicted values being sequenced by 
any variable.  Seasonality is an example of a sequencing variable. 
4. Normality of the error distribution was evaluated by reviewing normal 
probability plots.  Normal probability plots are graphs comparing the 
cumulative distribution of actual values with the cumulative distribution of  
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a normal distribution with normal distribution being represented by a 
straight, 45
o 
line.  The error distribution is reasonably close to a normal 
distribution.   
Revised Price Dispersion Framework 
The revised conceptual framework is illustrated in Figure 6 (below) along with 
the revised empirical model.  Hypotheses 2, 7, and 9 are deleted due to strategic 
similarity being dropped from the model.  The numerical sequence of the 
hypotheses is maintained consistent with the previous model and the hypotheses 
previously stated. 
Figure 6 – Revised Price Dispersion Framework 
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The following is the revised empirical model.  The original model is on p. 77. 
PRDij = β0 + β1 MMCij + β3 HHIij + β4 MSZij + β5 DSTij  
+ β6 HUBij  + β8 MMCij x HHIij + εij 
  where; i and j are the city pairs. 
 
PRD = price dispersion 
MMC = multi-market contact 
HHI = market concentration 
MSZ = market size 
DST = route distance 
HUB = hub airport 
εij = error term 
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Descriptive Statistics 
In Table IV, the means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlation matrix for 
the variables of interest are presented.  The correlations between the independent 
variables are relatively small and therefore, multicollinearity is not a concern in 
this analysis.  The largest correlation (0.37) is between market concentration and 
route distance, which is negatively correlated. 
 
Table IV - Descriptive Statistics (n = 5,974) 
   Correlation Coefficients 
Variable Mean Std Dev 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Price Dispersion 0.059 0.0006      
(2) Multi-Market Contact 0.248 0.0010 0.08     
(3) Concentration 0.458 0.0031 -0.43 0.14    
(4) Market Size 0.027 0.0008 -0.13 -0.29 0.01   
(5) Distance 0.416 0.0031 0.32 0.10 -0.37 -0.09  
(6) Hub 0.354 0.0062 -0.11 -0.19 0.02 0.34 -0.10 
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Table V shows the mean, standard deviation, high value, and low value for 
each variable.  Rescaling was performed on the data because all but two of the 
variables have the potential range of 0 to 1; market size was rescaled by dividing 
all values by its maximum value of 41,826, and route distance was rescaled by 
dividing all values by its maximum value of 2,729.   
Table V - Data Statistics  
     
Variable Low High Mean SD 
Price Dispersion 0 0.467 0.06 0.0006 
Multi-Market Contact (MMC) 0.001 0.403 0.25 0.0010 
Market Concentration (HHI) 0.127 0.999 0.46 0.0031 
Market Size 1 41826 1128 35 
Market Size/41826 0.000 1 0.03 0.0008 
Distance 18 2729 1136 8 
Distance/2729 0.007 1 0.42 0.0031 
Hub 0 1 0.35 0.0062 
Interaction of MMC & HHI 0.001 0.400 0.13 0.0010 
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Estimation Results 
The following estimation results are explained for the hypotheses previously 
discuss and shown in revised conceptual framework (Figure 6) above.  Table VI 
provides a summary of the regression results. 
 
Table VI - Regression Results  
 
Variable Hypothesis 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Beta Pr > ltl 
H1 
Multi-Market 
Contact 
Degree of MMC is positively 
related to price dispersion. 
0.193 0.327 <0.0001 
H3 
Market 
Concentration 
Degree of HHI is negatively 
related to price dispersion. 
-0.029 -0.127 0.0006 
H4 Market Size 
Market size is negatively related to 
price dispersion. 
-0.053 -0.073 <0.0001 
H5 Route Distance 
Length of the route is positively 
related to price dispersion. 
0.033 0.164 <0.0001 
H6 Hub Airport 
When a route is connected to a 
hub, there is a negative effect on 
price dispersion. 
-0.004 -0.044 0.0002 
H8 MMC x HHI 
As HHI increases, the effect of 
MMC on price dispersion 
decreases. 
-0.236 -0.377 <0.0001 
 
Multi-market contact.  H1 is supported (β1 = 0.327, p < 0.0001), indicating that 
in city-pair routes where multi-market contact is greater, there is more price 
dispersion.  In other words, when competitors in a local market have more 
contact in markets, the price dispersion tends to be greater in the local market.   
This finding is consistent with the research of Baum and Korn (1996), 
which found that in local markets where multi-market contact was greater, the 
entry and exit rates were lower, indicating a reduction in competitiveness.  This  
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study supports the premise that if firms feel less need to compete aggressively, 
they have more latitude in pricing, therefore in local markets where multi-
market contact is greater, there is larger price dispersion.   
The beta coefficient (β) is calculated from the data, after each variable is 
standardized by subtracting the mean from each value and dividing by the 
standard deviation for each variable.  By determining the beta coefficient, the 
variables can be compared to one another without regard to differences in units.  
This procedure allows the variables to be compared as to the relative effect each 
variable has on the dependent variable.  The larger the beta coefficient value, the 
greater the influence on the dependent variable.   
The beta coefficient of multi-market contact is relatively large (0.317) 
compared to all but one of the other beta values, which range from 0.044 to 
0.377.  This relatively large value indicates that multi-market contact is a 
relatively important variable in influencing the dependent variable, price 
dispersion. 
Multi-market contact has the coefficient estimate of 0.193, which is the 
highest of the main effect variables and is only second to the interaction variable 
that has a coefficient estimate of -0.236.  This result supports the multi-market 
contact theory, which postulates that as the degree of multi-market contact 
increases, price dispersion should increase.  This finding demonstrates the 
considerable positive effect that multi-market contact has on price dispersion.   
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Due to the large sample size, practical significance needs to be considered, 
as well as statistical significance.  In practical terms, for example, this means 
that if multi-market contact on a city-pair route increases from 0.25 to 0.30  
(a 20% increase in multi-market contact) price dispersion (as measured by Gini) 
can be expected to increase from 0.095 to 0.105 (a 10% increase in price 
dispersion).  The following statement by Borenstein and Rose may further 
expand the understanding of the effect on price dispersion.  “A Gini of 0.10 … 
implies an expected absolute price difference of 20 percent of the mean fare” 
(Borenstein and Rose 1994, p. 656).  This increase in price dispersion benefits 
the airlines and some consumers.  Airlines benefit from having greater flexibility 
in setting prices and gaining additional revenue and profit.  Consumers benefit 
by having more price options when selecting flights. 
Market concentration.  H3 is supported (β3 = -0.127, p = 0.0006), indicating that 
in local markets where concentration is greater, price dispersion in that market 
tends to be less.  In other words, in markets where market shares are more 
concentrated, less price dispersion occurs.  These results are consistent with 
Borenstein and Rose‟s (1994) study on price dispersion in the U.S. airfare 
market.  They analyzed pricing data to evaluate the effect of competition on 
price dispersion.  Market concentration is one of the variables used by 
Borenstein and Rose to evaluate the construct „competition‟.  Borenstein and 
Rose found that in local markets where market concentration is higher, there is 
less price dispersion.  Market concentration has also been applied by Hayes and 
Ross (1998), Walsh and Whelan (1999), and Zhao (2006) to evaluate the causes 
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of price dispersion.  Their findings reinforce the finding that in more 
concentrated markets, price dispersion tends to be less.  
Market concentration has the coefficient estimate of -0.029, which is 
relatively small compared to multi-market contact, but still has a significant 
negative influence on price dispersion. This result supports the oligopoly theory, 
which postulates that firms collude, either tacitly or purposively, within markets 
when they recognize their mutual dependence.  The more concentrated the 
market, the greater recognition of the firms‟ mutual dependence, resulting in less 
price dispersion.  This rationale is consistent with the finding of this study that 
as concentration in a local market increases, there tends to be less price 
dispersion.   
In practical terms, for example, this means that if market concentration on a 
city-pair route increases from 0.25 to 0.30 (a 20% increase in market 
concentration) price dispersion can be expected to decrease from 0.040 to 0.038 
(a 5% decrease in price dispersion).  In comparison to multi-market contact, 
market concentration has less effect on price dispersion.  
Market size.  H4 is supported (β4 = -0.073, p < 0.0001), indicating that in larger 
local markets, price dispersion in that market tends to be less.  In other words, in 
larger markets (i.e., more customers), less price dispersion occurs.  Market size 
has the coefficient estimate of -0.053, which is the second highest of the main 
effect variables.   
 This finding is consistent with Borenstein and Rose‟s (1994) study, which 
found that in larger markets, there is less price dispersion.  Their findings  
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support the rationale that in larger markets (i.e., more customers) there is more 
competitive pressure on the airlines, resulting in less price dispersion.  The 
finding of this study is also consistent with models of monopolistic competitive 
price discrimination (Borenstein 1985; Holmes 1989).   
In practical terms, for example, this means that if market size on a city-pair 
route increases from 0.25 to 0.30 (a 20% increase in market size) price 
dispersion can be expected to decrease from 0.024 to 0.031 (a 8% decrease in 
price dispersion).  In comparison to multi-market contact, market size has less 
effect on price dispersion, but more than market concentration.  
Route distance.  H5 is supported (β5 = 0.164, p < 0.0001), indicating that as route 
distance increases, there is greater price dispersion.  In other words, longer 
routes tend to have more price dispersion than shorter routes.  Route distance 
has the coefficient estimate of 0.033, which is the third highest of the main 
effect variables.   
The rationale behind this finding is that on longer routes, there tends to be 
less competition, which reduces the competitive pressure to compete on price.  
Furthermore, some passengers prefer more services on longer distance flights 
due to the longer times that they spend in the airplane, which leads to less price 
sensitivity and more price dispersion.  The finding of this study is consistent 
with prior research of Hayes and Ross (1998) who found that dispersion 
increases on longer route distances.   
In practical terms, for example, this means that if route distance on a city-
pair route increases from 0.25 to 0.30 (a 20% increase in route distance) price  
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dispersion can be expected to decrease from 0.055 to 0.057 (a 3% increase in 
price dispersion).  In comparison to multi-market contact, route distance has 
much less effect on price dispersion.  
Hub airport.   H6 is supported (β6 = -0.044, p = 0.0002), indicating that when the 
city-pair route is connected to an airport that is a hub for at least one airline 
(other than a focal airline), price dispersion on that route tends to be less.  In 
other words, in a local market where there is a dominant, local firm, (but not 
dominant nationally) less price dispersion occurs.  This finding is consistent 
with prior research of Hayes and Ross (1998) who found that dispersion was 
less in routes connected to hub airports than in routes connected to non-hub 
airports.  Hub airport has the coefficient estimate of -0.004, which is the third 
highest of the main effect variables, which is the smallest of all the coefficients, 
but still has a significant influence on price dispersion.   
In practical terms, for example, this means that if at least one of the airports 
on a city-pair route becomes a hub (the „hub airport‟ variable changes from 0 to 
1), price dispersion can be expected to decrease from 0.047 to 0.043 (a 9% 
decrease in price dispersion).  In comparison to a 10 % increase in multi-market 
contact, if at least one of the airports on a city-pair route becomes a hub, the 
magnitude of the effect of the hub airport is similar, but opposite in direction of 
a 10 % increase in multi-market contact‟s effect on price dispersion. 
Interaction of multi-market contact and market concentration.  
H8 is supported (β8 = -0.377, p < 0.0001), indicating that the effect of multi-
market contact on price dispersion is less in local markets where there is greater 
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market concentration.  In other words, in local markets where there is a higher 
degree of market concentration, the increase in price dispersion (that occurs as 
multi-market contact increases) is less than it would be in less concentrated 
markets.  This finding is consistent with prediction of Fuentelsaz and Gomez 
(2006) who hypothesized that the effect of multi-market contact on mutual 
forbearance would decrease in more concentrated markets.     
The interaction between multi-market contact and local market 
concentration has the coefficient estimate of -0.236, which is the highest of the 
independent variables.  This finding is consistent with the multi-market contact 
theory, which predicts that the more multi-market contact among competing 
firms, the competitive pressure within a market is likely to be less.  The reduced 
competitive pressure should result in greater price dispersion within a local 
market.  Multi-market theory in combination with linked oligopoly theory 
suggests that linkage between firms in multiple markets will be affected by 
concentration within the local markets.  Linked oligopoly theory implies that 
mutual forbearance will be more influential in concentrated markets.  This 
finding supports Heggestad and Rhoades‟ (1978) conclusion that when 
evaluating a local market‟s competitive environment, only considering market 
concentration may be misleading due to multi-market contact‟s potential to 
reduce rivalry, even in concentrated markets.   
This finding supports previous research by Bernheim and Whinston (1990), 
Scott (1982, 1991) and Phillips and Mason (1992), whose studies show that 
mutual forbearance should be greatest when market concentration is high.  The  
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rationale for this outcome is that it in an oligopoly market structure, it is easier 
for firms who are multipoint rivals to collude and forbear in a concentrated 
market than it is for firms that are multi-point rivals in less concentrated 
markets.  Firms in highly concentrated markets tend to know each other‟s 
strategic patterns better than they know the strategic patters of competitors in 
less concentrated markets.  The finding of this study that the effect of multi-
market contact on price dispersion is less in local markets where there is greater 
market concentration supports this rationale and theory. 
It is not as simple to compare the interaction between multi-market contact 
and market concentration, as it is to compare the main effect variables.  The 
added complexity is due to the interaction terms‟ dependence on the values of 
multi-market contact and market concentration.  The following section 
demonstrates and discusses the interaction effect of multi-market contact and 
market concentration on price dispersion.  The section also provides practical 
insight into the relationship between multi-market contact, market concentration, 
and price dispersion.  
Demonstration of the interaction effect of multi-market contact and market 
concentration on price dispersion.  
Table VII and Figure 7 show the effect that market concentration has on the 
relationship between multi-market contact and price dispersion.  In order to 
demonstrate the change that occurs when multi-market contact and market 
concentration interact, a median-split approach was applied to separate the data 
into four roughly equally sized groups of data.  A median-split approach  
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separates the data in groups based on the median value of the variable.  The 
average price dispersion for each data set was then calculated and then 
compared in Table VII to show that in markets where market concentration is 
greater, the effect that multi-market contact is not only reduced, by the as multi-
market contact increases, the regression line has a reduced rate (slope).  This 
phenomenon is also shown graphically in Figure 7.  Multi-market contact and 
market concentration are both continuous variables and this split-means 
approach has been applied to demonstrate the relationship proposed in H8 and 
the resulting outcome of this analysis, which supports H8. 
The calculations used in the creation of this table are based on an initial 
median split of market concentration (median 0.500), then a median split of 
multi-market contact (median 0.252).  It shows that the average price dispersion 
decreases significantly (-0.031) in markets of greater concentration when multi-
market contact is relatively low and average price dispersion decreases 
significantly (-0.035) in markets of greater concentration when multi-market 
contact is relatively high.  In other words, in markets where market contact is 
high, the estimated regression line for multi-market contact and price dispersion 
(which has a positive relationship, as confirmed by the results of this study and 
shown in Table VII), is shifted downward and more important to H8, the slope of 
the regression line is less. 
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Table VII - Multi-Market Contact & Concentration Interaction (H8) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 shows the effect that market concentration has of the relationship 
between multi-market contact and price dispersion.  The upper (solid) line is the 
regressed relationship between multi-market contact and price dispersion when 
the market concentration values are at the median or below.  The lower (dash) 
line is the regressed relationship between multi-market contact and price 
dispersion when the market concentration values are above the median value.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Multi-Market Contact 
  
Low (0.252 & 
below) 
High (0.253 & 
above) 
  Price Dispersion (Average) 
Market 
Concentration 
High (0.501 
& above) 
0.037 0.048 
(n = 1,315) (n = 1,645) 
Low (0.500 
& below) 
0.068 0.083 
(n = 1,804) (n = 1,210) 
Change (from low to high) -0.031 -0.035 
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The graph (Figure 7) shows that market concentration not only reduces the 
effect of multi-market contact on price dispersion, but also has a stronger 
reducing effect as multi-market contact increases.  The increase in the reduction 
of price dispersion as multi-market contact increases, when market 
concentration is high, is the relationship predicted and hypothesized in H8, and 
shown to be significant in this study.  In other words, multi-market contact has 
less effect on price dispersion, when market concentration is greater. 
 
Figure 7 – Interaction of Multi-Market Contact 
and Market Concentration (H8) 
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Model Fit 
One of the key objectives of this research is to evaluate and demonstrate the 
benefit of including an evaluation of the macro competitive environment (i.e., 
multi-market contact) on price dispersion in local markets.  The following chart 
shows the degree to which including multi-market contact improves the 
explanation of price dispersion beyond what market concentration (measured by 
HHI) explains.  
 As the following Table VIII (below) shows, when market concentration is 
applied exclusively to explain price dispersion, the adjusted R
2
 value is 0.182, 
meaning that market concentration explains 18.2% of the variation in price 
dispersion.  By including multi-market contact and the interaction of 
concentration and multi-market contact, 20.9% of the variation is explained and 
with the full model, 24.2% is explained.  The increase in adjusted R
2
 from 0.182 
to 0.242 is a 33% increase in adjusted R
2
 and demonstrates the value of 
considering multi-market contact and local market conditions when evaluating 
price dispersion.   
Table VIII - Comparison of Results 
    
Condition Adjusted R
2
 
Change in 
Adjusted R
2
 
Percent 
Improvement 
Market concentration 
alone 
0.182 ----- ----- 
Multi-market contact 
with market 
concentration and 
interaction 
0.209 0.027 15% 
Simplified model 0.242 0.060 33% 
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The purpose of this study is to expand the understanding of the effects of 
competition, especially multi-market contact, on price dispersion.  As stated in 
the beginning of this study, there are other known influences on price dispersion.  
The three main sources of price dispersion, identified and described by prior 
academic studies (e.g., Borenstein and Rose 1994; Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar 
2003; Zhao 2006) and discussed in the introduction (Chapter 1) of this study, are 
search cost, consumer heterogeneity, and competition.  Some of the specific 
factors that may further explain why price dispersion occurs in airline ticket 
fares that are outside the scope of this research are: 
1. Lead time in purchasing tickets.  Airlines use revenue management 
systems that vary prices to maximize revenue.  
2. Business versus tourist destinations and passenger mix. 
3. Pricing promotions, such as weekend stays. 
4. Group (e.g., family) travel versus individual. 
5. Ticket agent type; online, airline, travel agency, travel discounter (e.g., 
Priceline). 
6. Direct versus connecting flights. 
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CHAPTER VI 
IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, & CONCLUSION 
Academic Implications 
The findings of this empirical analysis have important theoretical implications.  
The most significant academic contribution of this study is the development of a 
conceptual framework of the competitive determinants (e.g., multi-market 
contact and market concentration) on price dispersion in a complex, service 
market context.  Another contribution is that this study is a conceptual, 
empirically based, cross-sectional evaluation of price dispersion.  This study 
evaluated the influence of two, important, recently developed variables; multi-
market contact and strategic similarity on price dispersion, as well as the 
extensively researched, market concentration.  Strategic similarity was not 
useful in this study due to its high collinearity with multi-market contact.  Even 
though multi-market contact and strategic similarity are conceptually very 
different variables, the results produced by the model were much clearer without 
strategic similarity. 
 Market concentration is related to oligopoly theory, which deals with inter-
firm coordination (Baum and Korn 1996).  In oligopoly theory, collusion, either 
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tacit or purposive, among firms is predicted to occur because firms recognize 
their mutual dependence.  However, in oligopoly theory, coordination derives 
from greater market concentration, not from multi-market contact (Scherer and 
Ross 1990).  This study shows that market concentration has a small, but 
significant influence on price dispersion; coefficient estimate (-0.029) and beta 
(-0.127).  The results support the theory by demonstrating that as market 
concentration increases, price dispersion tends to decrease.   
An additional theoretical implication is the extension of multi-market 
competition theory to price dispersion.  This theory suggests that when two rival 
firms compete in multiple markets, intensity of rivalry decreases due to mutual 
forbearance (Edwards 1955; Bernheim and Whinston 1990; Baum and Korn 
1996; Jayachandran, Gimeno, and Varadarajan 1999).  This decrease in rivalry 
results in greater price dispersion due to firms feeling less pressure to match or 
be close to competitors‟ prices.  This study shows that multi-market contact has 
a significant influence on price dispersion.  Multi-market contact has the highest 
coefficient estimate (0.193) and beta (0.327) of the main effect variables.  This 
result supports the theory by demonstrating that as the degree of multi-market 
contact increases, price dispersion tends to increase.   
The interaction between multi-market contact and local market 
concentration has useful implications for pricing research.  Linked oligopoly 
theory (Solomon 1970) suggests that an important determinant of performance 
in oligopolistic market is the degree of linkage between markets or firms‟ 
presence in multiple markets.  This theory assumes that multi-market firms  
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coordinate their operations across markets and that this coordination affects the 
intensity of rivalry.  Heggestad and Rhoades (1978) concluded that considering 
only market concentration could be misleading because multi-market contact 
will likely reduce rivalry, even in concentrated markets.  Linked oligopoly 
theory suggests that it seems likely that mutual forbearance will be more 
influential in concentrated markets.  
The interaction of multi-market contact and market concentration has the 
highest coefficient estimate (-0.236) and beta (0.377) of any variable in the 
model.  This result supports the theory by demonstrating that as the degree of 
multi-market contact increases, price dispersion tends to increase.  Furthermore, 
this result supports the previous research (e.g., Bernheim and Whinston 1990; 
Scott 1982, 1991; Phillips and Mason 1992), which indicated that mutual 
forbearance will be greatest when market concentration is high.  The rationale 
for this is that it is easier for oligopolists who are multipoint rivals to collude 
and forbear from intense rivalry, even easier than it is for multi-point rivals in 
less concentrated markets to do so.  The finding of this study that the effect of 
multi-market contact on price dispersion is less in local markets where there is 
greater market concentration supports this rationale and theory. 
 This research also provides insight on strategic group theory.  Gimeno and 
Woo (1996) suggest that multi-market contact and strategic similarity are two 
distinct dimensions of strategic heterogeneity and should be considered 
separately to evaluate their effects of intensity of rivalry.  In this study, when 
multi-market contact and strategic similarity were both in the model, they were  
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highly correlated which made it difficult to evaluate the effect of each variable 
due to the strong interrelationship.  The results of this study support the findings 
of Gimeno and Woo, which show that multi-market contact strongly decreases 
the intensity of rivalry, whereas strategic similarity moderately increases it, 
indicating that multi-market contact is the more useful variable in evaluating 
strategic heterogeneity.   
Managerial Implications 
Airlines, as well as other fixed capacity, service organizations, are seeking 
information to help them improve the financial performance of their 
organizations.  This study has several useful and valuable implications for 
managers.  The information presented can be useful to marketing managers in 
developing pricing strategies by helping them better understand likely 
competitive reactions to changes in market structure.  This information on the 
effects of competition on price dispersion applies to managers working for firms 
that are considering entering new markets. The information is can also be useful 
to mangers of rival firms working in the local market when a rival firm enters 
the local market. 
Managers can apply the conceptual framework on price dispersion to 
evaluating the effect of strategic moves (e.g., pricing strategies, market entry 
and exit) on market price dispersion.  This framework can help managers to 
better understand how rival firms, who they compete against in other markets, 
may affect the price dispersion in the local markets, if their firm or a rival firm 
enters the local market.  The framework developed in this study can be applied  
 120 
 
 
to improve the accuracy of predicting price dispersion in local markets.  When 
managers are evaluating market attractiveness, revenue potential and profit 
potential are important considerations.  The framework presented in this study 
can improve the accuracy in the evaluation of target markets before firms enter 
new, local markets.  Price dispersion has an important influence on revenue and 
profitability.   
The finding that multi-market contact has a significant impact on price 
dispersion means that revenue and profitability opportunities can be better 
evaluated before entering a local market where there are competitors that are 
also in other local markets.  Multi-market contact had the second highest beta 
coefficient (0.327), only slightly less than the interaction of market 
concentration and multi-market contact.  The implication for managers is that 
competitors in a local market do not feel the need to compete aggressively in the 
local market when they have the means to retaliate in other markets.  For 
example, if a firm is planning to enter a new market, the firms in that local 
market may not feel the need to compete aggressively in the local market due to 
the deterrence based on their means to retaliate in other markets.   
The interaction of market concentration on multi-market contact reinforces 
the prior research, showing that the degree of concentration has a significant 
influence on the effect that multi-market contact has on price dispersion.  This 
interaction has the highest beta coefficient (-0.377).  The finding of this research 
is that multi-market contact has its greatest affect on price dispersion when 
market concentrations are relatively low. 
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The interaction of market concentration on multi-market contact is 
graphically represented in Figure 7.  This interaction shows managers that by 
evaluating the degree of multi-market contact and market concentration of the 
firms in a local market (e.g., city-pair route) they can anticipate changes in price 
dispersion in the local market.  Higher levels of price dispersion signify that 
managers have greater flexibility to vary price than when the lower levels of 
price dispersion are indicated.  The understanding of changes in price dispersion 
can be used in developing pricing strategies and anticipating pricing changes 
that competitors may make. 
 The finding that route distance has a positive affect on price dispersion, and 
has the third highest beta coefficient (0.164), indicates the importance of 
considering route distance when planning pricing strategies.  This finding 
indicates that there is less price competition on longer routes and as a result 
price dispersion tends to be greater.  The finding that market concentration is a 
significant factor in understanding how competition affects price dispersion is 
not surprising given the extensive research supporting the concept that higher 
levels of concentration increases market power in those firms with large market 
shares.  Market concentration has a negative effect on price dispersion and the 
fourth highest beta coefficient (-0.127), which supports the prior research in that 
few and more dominant firms tends to result in less price dispersion.  This study 
shows that when multi-market contact is considered, market concentration has 
far less impact on explaining price dispersion. 
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The finding that market size (i.e., the number of passengers on the route) 
has a negative influence on price dispersion indicates that on routes where more 
passengers travel, there is less price dispersion.  Market size has the fifth highest 
beta coefficient (-0.073).  The finding that routes connecting to a hub airport 
have a negative influence on price dispersion indicates that on routes that 
connect to a hub airport, there is less price dispersion.  „Hub airport‟ has the 
sixth highest beta coefficient (-0.044).   
Managers have the means to measure all of the independent variables in this 
study.  By measuring and evaluating these variables, the model developed in this 
study predicts the effect of competition on price dispersion.  The findings of this 
study suggest that managers can benefit from monitoring and assessing multi-
market contact and market concentration in local markets when making pricing 
decisions.  A better understanding of the factors (i.e., multi-market contact, 
strategic similarity, market concentration) that cause price dispersion to expand 
or contract provides important and useful information to managers developing 
pricing strategies and setting prices. 
In summary, it is important for managers to understand that market 
concentration alone provides a limited insight into how firms competing in a 
local market react to each other when developing pricing strategies.  The 
influence of multi-market contact in conjunction with local market concentration 
greatly improves the insight into how firms competing in a local market react to 
each other.  This study showed that the adjusted R
2
 increased by 33% when all 
of the variables in the simplified model were evaluated, with multi-market  
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contact and the interaction of multi-marketing contact being major contributors 
to the increase in adjusted R
2
.  The adjusted R
2
 indicates the proportion of 
variance explained by the independent variables.  The larger the adjusted R
2
 
value, the greater the explanatory power of the regression equation, and the 
better the regression equation is at predicting the dependent variable.  The 
improvement in predictive power of the model developed in this study can be 
applied by managers to increase the revenue and profitability of their firms. 
Limitations 
This research has limitations that suggest opportunities for future research.  
First, the data are from 1999.  Since then, the U.S. airline industry has been 
affected by major changes in security regulations and dramatic increases in fuel 
prices.  Also, the number of network airlines has decreased from seven to four 
and the number of low-fare airlines has increased.  Future research using newer 
data may provide different results. 
 Second, this is a study of the U.S. airfare market and airfare pricing in 
markets in other countries may be affected differently by competition.  Most 
other countries do not have the large number of domestic airlines competing for 
customers.  Also, the different strategies of domestic airlines do not exist in 
most other counties.  The circumstances that exist in the U.S. airfare market and 
airfare pricing reduces the generalizability of this study in those other markets.  
Third, this study focuses on competitive factors and related market 
characteristics.  There are other factors, such as customer related factors that 
influence price dispersion.  If additional data related to these factors is 
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attainable, a more complete model could likely be developed.  Some of these 
other factors are as follows: 
1. Lead time in purchasing tickets.  Airlines use revenue management 
systems that vary prices to maximize revenue.  
2. Business versus tourist destinations and passenger mix. 
3. Pricing promotions, such as weekend stays. 
4. Group (e.g., family) travel versus individual. 
5. Ticket agent type; online, airline, travel agency, travel discounter (e.g., 
Priceline). 
6. Direct versus connecting flights. 
Future Research Directions 
Several implications and direction for future research can be drawn from the 
results of this study, as well as from some of the limitations.  First, since the 
findings of this study are based on firms in a single, geographically bounded 
industry during one quarter, it is possible that the results reflect some factors 
specific to the industry, geographic region, or period under study.  Further 
replications of this study in other circumstances are needed to address this 
possibility.   
Second, development of a comprehensive variable for strategic competitive 
heterogeneity that may include multi-market contact and strategic similarity is 
worth exploring.  One of the fundamental issues is to determine what 
characteristics of firms set them apart from competitors in ways that affect their 
marketing strategies and how consumers perceive value of their product 
offerings.  When firms can increase the perceived value of their product 
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offerings, they can increase sales revenue, profitability relative to other firms 
with less attractive products.  Findings of this research show that multi-market 
contact in conjunction with market concentration improves the potential for 
firms to increase their financial performance in the marketplace.  
 Third, another option is to expand the model developed in this study to 
include some of the customer-based variables that influence price dispersion.  If 
data on customer characteristics that are connected with prices paid for tickets 
can be acquired, it is likely that a broader based, more explanatory model could 
be developed to explain more of the reasons for price dispersion.  The focus of 
this study is limited to increasing the understanding of the competitive factors 
that influence price dispersion. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this empirical study has been to evaluate the affects of several 
key factors, especially multi-market contact and strategic similarity, on price 
dispersion in the airline industry.  This study supports the concept that firms 
respond to competition by engaging in search for alternative ways to improve 
their performance.  One of the research goals of this study is to increase the 
understanding of the effect of multi-market contact on price dispersion.  Prior 
research has not included multi-market contact to evaluate price dispersion.  The 
results show the importance of including multi-market contact and other key 
market characteristics in models that addresses competition within markets. 
 The conceptual framework developed in the study makes an important 
contribution to the understanding of the competitive determinants on price 
dispersion in a complex, service market.  This study is the first known to 
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evaluate the influence of two important variables, multi-market contact and 
strategic similarity, on price dispersion.  The results of this study have the 
potential for application in other fixed capacity, service applications, such as 
entertainment (including sporting event venues), other forms of public 
transportation (e.g., trains, buses, and ships), and distribution of energy (e.g., 
electricity).  The results expand the understanding of competition theory that 
may be useful to academic researchers, as well as provide viable information 
that may be useful to marketing practitioners. 
This study also provides information that may be useful in the development 
of future government policies related to competition‟s effect on market 
efficiency and social welfare.  Social welfare considers the well-being of society 
at large and includes the welfare of both consumers and producers.  Society is 
considered to be better off when resources are used efficiently to maximize the 
welfare of consumers and producers.   Price dispersion has been shown to 
improve market efficiency and social welfare (Varian 1996; Brynjolfsson and 
Smith 2000; Borenstein and Rose 1994; Rob 1985).   
 Differential pricing (which results in price dispersion) improves economic 
efficiency and social welfare when the marginal willingness to pay equals 
marginal cost Varian (1996).  Willingness to pay varies by customer, and 
therefore producers can apply different prices under different circumstances and 
improve customer satisfaction while improving the firm‟s profitability.  An 
example is first class and coach class airline tickets.  These tickets have different 
prices for consumers with different willingness to pay perspectives as well as 
slightly different marginal costs. 
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 The type of economic efficiency applied in this argument is referred to as 
Pareto efficiency.  An economic situation is considered Pareto efficient when 
there is no way to make one consumer better off without making some other 
consumer worse off.  Pareto efficiency occurs when marginal willingness to pay 
equals marginal cost.  Another factor influencing economic efficiency and social 
welfare is the degree of price discrimination.  Third-degree price discrimination 
(when a firm sells its product to different consumers at different prices) is 
prevalent in the airline industry as well as other high fixed cost industries 
(Varian 1996).  Varian‟s analysis shows that price dispersion often increases 
economic efficiency and social welfare.  The rationale is that when price 
dispersion allows more customers to be served, social welfare is increased.   
As shown by the classic economic model of social welfare, when a single 
price is set above the theoretical equilibrium price, some consumers miss out on 
socially efficient exchanges.  Not only do some consumers lose the opportunity 
to make efficient purchases, firms lose the opportunity to receive the sales 
revenue from those purchases.  Therefore, by developing policies that supports a 
level of competition, which encourages price dispersion, market efficiency and 
social welfare is increased.  This study shows that higher levels of multi-market 
contact increase price dispersion, while market concentration decreases price 
dispersion.  Based on prior research and this study, policies could be developed 
to encourage firms to expand into new markets while discouraging concentration 
in local markets. 
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SELECTED RESEARCH ON SOURCES OF PRICE DISPERSION 
    
  
Study 
Subject of 
Analysis 
Results/Conclusions 
  Consumer heterogeneity 
1 Biswas, Dutta, 
and Pullig (2006)   
Branded DVD 
player 
Low price guarantee effects attenuated when 
consumers perceive market price dispersion to be high.  
Consumer heterogeneity was evaluated on the basis of 
differences in perceived price dispersion. 
2 Zhao (2006) Grocery items Price dispersion and consumer heterogeneity shown to 
be highly correlated.  Demographic variables included 
education and income of consumers.    
3 Burman and 
Biswas (2004) 
DVD player, 
camera 
When price dispersion is narrow, reference price is 
more likely to be high, reducing the effectiveness of 
reference pricing.  Consumer heterogeneity was 
evaluated on the basis of differences in value 
perception and shopping intention. 
4 Clemons, Hann, 
Hitt (2002) 
Airline tickets sold 
online  
Significant price dispersion exists online.  One of the 
causes identified was consumer heterogeneity related 
to differences between 'time-sensitive' travelers and 
'price-sensitive' travelers. 
5 Rhee (1998) Generic, 
differentiated 
products 
Price dispersion can be due to consumer heterogeneity 
related to differences in willingness to pay for quality 
and other attributes.  
6 Borenstein and 
Rose (1994) 
Airline tickets  Price dispersion exists in the airline ticket market in 
part due to consumer heterogeneity related to 
segmentation based on businesses and vacation 
passengers. 
7 Shepard (1991)  Gasoline Price dispersion can occur in multi-firm markets due 
to price discrimination when consumer heterogeneity 
exists related to differences in willingness to pay.  
8 Diamond (1987) Consumer product Price dispersion can exist in consumer markets due to 
consumer heterogeneity related differences in 
consumers' willingness to pay. 
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Study 
Subject of 
Analysis 
Results/Conclusions 
 
Consumer heterogeneity (continued) 
9 Varian (1980) Retail products 
sold in stores 
It is in the sellers' best interest to randomize prices to 
price discriminate between informed and uniformed 
consumers.  Thus, consumer heterogeneity based the 
consumer‟s level of pricing information is a cause of 
price dispersion.    
10 Salop and Stiglitz 
(1977) 
Commodity Price dispersion can occur in multi-firm markets due 
to price discrimination when consumer heterogeneity 
exists related to differences in willingness to pay.  
       
 Consumer search costs  
11 Zhao (2006) Grocery items Price dispersion and consumer search costs were 
shown to be highly correlated across stores, across 
UPCs within a product category, and over time for a 
brand.  
12 Walter, Gupta, 
Su (2006) 
Commodities, 
quasi-
commodities, and 
differentiated 
products. 
Price dispersion existed across all product types and 
results suggest that the Internet did not compress 
consumer search cost heterogeneity, although it did 
reduce overall search costs for all users.   
13 Sorensen (2000) Prescription drugs Price dispersion is lower for repeatedly purchased 
prescriptions, for which the expected benefits relative 
to consumer search costs are highest. 
14 Stahl (1989) Commodity Price dispersion caused by increasing consumer 
search costs. Price distribution changes from 'perfectly 
competitive' pricing to the 'monopoly' pricing as 
search cost and population parameters change.  
15 Dahlby and West 
(1986) 
Automobile 
insurance 
Price dispersion explained by costly consumer search 
costs. Consumers are often unwilling to change 
insurance companies due to the perceived cost of 
getting and comparing insurance quotations. 
16 Rob (1985) Commodity Price dispersion arises in informationally imperfect 
markets due to the distribution of consumer search 
costs. 
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Study 
Subject of 
Analysis 
Results/Conclusions 
 
Consumer search costs (continued) 
17 Salop and Stiglitz 
(1982) 
Commodity Price dispersion depends on the magnitude of 
consumer search costs and degree of scale economies.    
18 Braverman 
(1980)  
Commodity Differences in consumers’ search costs determine 
what type of equilibrium arises: perfectly competitive, 
monopolistically competitive, or price dispersion. 
19 Pratt, Wise, 
Zeckhauser 
(1979) 
Thirty-nine, 
standard products 
Price dispersion explained by positive consumer 
search costs.  Buyers employ searching and buying 
strategies in deciding whether to seek further price 
quotations; balancing the prospect of searching for a 
lower price against greater incurred search costs. 
20 Stigler (1961) Branded car and 
type of coal   
Price dispersion caused by consumers‟ lack of 
information due to consumer search costs and 
variations in „terms of sale‟.  
    
 Competition 
21 Zhao (2006) Grocery items Price dispersion and competition were shown to be 
highly correlated.  Price dispersion increases as new 
stores enter the market. 
22 Dana (1999) Airline tickets  Price dispersion shown to increase as competition 
increased due to increasing the number of firms in the 
market.   
23 Walsh and 
Whelan (1999) 
Grocery items Price dispersion over the price of related brands 
increased with competition when conditioned on brand 
distribution structures.   
24 Borenstein and 
Rose (1994) 
Airline tickets  Price dispersion increases on routes with more 
competition.  As the number of competitors on a route 
grows, price dispersion increases.  
25 Borenstein 
(1989) 
Airline tickets  Price dispersion is affect by competition.  The greater 
the number of passengers on a route and the greater 
the dominance of an airline at a terminal positively 
influences price dispersion.   
26 Moorthy (1988) Differentiated, 
consumer products 
Price dispersion increases with competition as 
differentiation between product attributes increases.   
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   APPENDIX B   
     p. 1 of 6 
      
 SELECTED LITERATURE RELATED TO PRICE DISPERSION 
      
 
Study 
Objectives / Research 
Questions 
Industry/Setting Methods Results/Conclusions 
 Price Dispersion: Competition Focused Research     
1 Ancarani 
and Shankar 
(2004) 
Comparison of price 
dispersion and price 
levels.  
Three types of 
retailers: Internet 
only, traditional, 
and multi-channel 
Means, std 
dev, t-tests 
Pure-play e-tailers 
shown to had the 
lowest price 
dispersion and the 
highest range of 
prices.  Multi-
channel retailers had 
the highest price 
dispersion. 
2 Baye, 
Morgan, and 
Scholten 
(2004) 
Tests the effect of “hit-
and-run” pricing 
strategies (i.e., short 
term price promotion 
undertaken at 
unpredictable intervals) 
on price dispersion. 
Online consumer 
electronics  
Coefficient 
of 
variation - 
cross-
sectional 
analysis - 
time series 
Price dispersion in 
online markets is 
increased by hit-and-
run pricing strategies 
by the firms.  Hit-
and run-pricing 
shown to be an 
effective and widely 
used by e-tailer 
managers.    
3 Brynjolfsson 
and Smith 
(2000) 
Evaluation of price 
dispersion and price 
levels.  Research 
question: Will 
competition on the 
Internet lead to lower 
and more homogeneous 
prices?   
Books and CDs 
sold through 
Internet or 
traditional 
channels 
Means, std 
dev, t-tests 
Price dispersion 
arises from two 
forms of retailer 
heterogeneity; (1) 
customer awareness 
and (2) branding and 
trust.  Price 
dispersion higher 
online and prices 
lower online. 
4 Walsh and 
Whelan 
(1999) 
Examine whether price 
dispersion between 
related brands is an 
outcome of brand 
pricing across different 
localized monopolies of 
oligopolistic segments 
of the market.   
Grocery items in 
the Ireland. 
Regression Price dispersion 
over the retail price 
of related brands is 
estimated to increase 
with competition 
when conditioned on 
brand distribution 
structures. 
 140 
 
 
      
     p. 2 of 6 
 
Study 
Objectives / Research 
Questions 
Industry/Setting Methods Results/Conclusions 
 Price Dispersion: Competition Focused Research (continued) 
5 Dana 
(1999) 
Evaluate intrafirm, 
equilibrium price 
dispersion in three 
fundamental market 
structures; perfect 
competition, monopoly, 
and oligopoly.  Assess the 
effect of revenue 
management on price 
dispersion.  
Airline tickets  Theoretical 
proofs 
Price dispersion 
showed to increase 
as competition 
increased due to 
increasing the 
number of firms in 
the market. 1.  Price 
rigidities and 
demand uncertainty 
lead not only to 
interfirm price 
dispersion but also 
to intrafirm price 
dispersion.  2. Price 
dispersion increases 
with the number of 
firms, in contrast to 
the relationship 
predicted by typical 
models of price 
discrimination.   
6 Borenstein 
and Rose 
(1994) 
Study the relationship 
between price dispersion 
and factors, especially 
competition, that might 
indicate either price 
discrimination or cost 
variations.   
Airline tickets   Regression,  
summary 
statistics  
1. Magnitude of 
price dispersion due 
to market structure, 
number of 
competitors, and 
airport dominance 
(all increase 
dispersion).   2.  
Frequency of flights 
decreases price 
dispersion. 
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Study 
Objectives / 
Research Questions 
Industry/Setting Methods Results/Conclusions 
 Price Dispersion: Consumer Focused Research     
7 Biswas, 
Dutta, 
and 
Pullig 
(2006)   
Examine how the 
effects of a low price 
guarantee are 
moderated by 
consumer perception 
of market price 
dispersion.     
Branded DVD 
player 
ANOVA, 
ANCOVA 
Results show that 
low price guarantee 
effects are likely to 
be attenuated when 
consumers perceive 
market price 
dispersion for a 
product to be high.  
Results show that 
higher levels of 
penalty can help 
restore a low price 
guarantee‟s 
effectiveness.   
8 Zhao 
(2006) 
Exploratory study of 
price dispersion.  
Checks consistency 
of the evidence on 
price dispersion with 
the existing theories 
of price dispersion 
due to costly 
consumer search, 
competition, and 
consumer 
heterogeneity.   
Grocery products Regression, 
cross-
sectional 
analysis, 
time series, 
coefficient 
of variation 
Price dispersion is 
positively correlated 
with consumer 
search costs, 
competition, and 
consumer 
heterogeneity. 
9 Burman 
and 
Biswas 
(2004)   
Examine the role of 
price dispersion and 
need for cognition in 
influencing consumer 
evaluation of 
reference prices. Key 
research question: 
Are there conditions 
when implausible 
reference prices may 
not have the potential 
for deception?   
VCR, calculator, 
DVD player, 
student desk, 
bike 
ANOVA 
(price 
dispersion 
is an 
independent 
variable) 
Findings 
demonstrate the 
potential of price 
dispersion in 
strengthening the 
impact of 
implausible 
reference prices on 
consumer 
evaluations.  
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Study 
Objectives / 
Research 
Questions 
Industry/Setting Methods Results/Conclusions 
 
Price Dispersion: Consumer Focused Research (continued) 
10 Sorensen 
(2000) 
Establish the 
empirical 
importance of 
price dispersion 
due to costly 
consumer search 
by examining 
retail prices. 
Prescription 
drugs 
Regression, 
summary 
statistics  
Price dispersion is lower 
for repeatedly purchased 
prescriptions, for which 
the expected benefits of 
search are highest. 
11 Dahlby 
and 
West 
(1986) 
Test whether 
price dispersion 
is base on costly 
consumer 
search. 
Automobile 
insurance 
Regression, 
cross-
sectional 
analysis, 
time series  
Price dispersion shown to 
be based on consumer 
search costs. 
12 Salop 
and 
Stiglitz 
(1977) 
Explore the 
problem of 
heterogeneity of 
consumer 
rationality with 
a model of 
monopolistically 
competitive 
price dispersion. 
“Durable 
commodity” 
Theoretical 
proofs 
1. Shows that if prices do 
settle down, they will 
settle at the monopoly 
price or there may be 
permanent price 
dispersion in the range 
between the perfectly 
competitive and 
monopolistically 
competitive prices.  2. 
Final price dispersion 
depends on the magnitude 
of information costs and 
degree of scale 
economies.    
13 Stigler 
(1961) 
Analyze the 
effects of price 
advertising on 
consumer search 
costs and the 
resulting affect 
on price 
dispersion. 
Cars and coal Theoretical 
proofs 
1. Price dispersion is 
affect by search cost for 
both buyers and sellers; a 
lower search cost reduces 
price dispersion.  
Therefore, price 
advertising reduces price 
dispersion.  Market size 
and the number of sellers 
affects price dispersion. 
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Study 
Objectives / 
Research 
Questions 
Industry/Setting Methods Results/Conclusions 
 Price Dispersion: Market Structure Focused 
1
4 
Lindsey-
Mullikin, 
Grewal 
(2006) 
Empirically test 
the concept that 
as the mean price 
of durables 
increases, the 
degree of price 
dispersion also 
increases.   
Durables sold 
online 
Regression  1.  Demonstrates that as 
mean price of an item 
increases, price dispersion 
also increases.  2.  Results 
provide evidence that, 
contrary to general 
economic expectations, the 
Internet has not 
commoditized products.   
1
5 
Xing, 
Yang, and 
Tang 
(2006) 
Is price 
dispersion 
between two 
types of online 
retailers different 
and if so, will the 
difference 
increase of 
decrease in the 
long run? 
DVDs sold 
online 
Regression  Price dispersions of online 
branches of multichannel 
retailers and Dotcoms are 
significantly different and 
the differences decrease 
with time.   
1
6 
Pan, 
Ratchford, 
and 
Shankar 
(2004) 
Meta-analysis - 
Review of 
literature on 
online price 
dispersion.  
Addresses 
whether price 
dispersion is 
greater or smaller 
online than off-
line, examine 
whether price 
dispersion on the 
Internet has 
changed over 
time, and 
investigate the 
drivers of online 
price dispersion. 
Many N/A Price dispersion is high and 
different across the 
different retailer types 
suggest that multi-channel 
retailers can price suitably 
to differentiate themselves 
not only among other multi-
channel retailers, but also 
from other types of retails.     
 
 144 
 
 
      
     p. 6 of 6 
 
Study 
Objectives / 
Research 
Questions 
Industry/Setti
ng 
Method
s 
Results/Conclusions 
 Price Dispersion: Market Structure Focused (continued) 
1
7 
Klein 
and 
Loebbec
ke (2003) 
Compares online 
and offline pricing 
strategies that 
affect price 
dispersion.  
Research question: 
What is the impact 
of the Internet in 
the design and 
implementation of 
pricing strategies?  
In particular, what 
will be the role of 
flexible pricing 
models that give 
customers an 
extended role in 
negotiations?   
Scheduled 
airline flights 
N/A Price dispersion on the 
Internet is being 
influenced by two 
fundamental pricing 
strategies: smaller 
suppliers applying 
intermediated pricing 
models and the 
mainstream suppliers 
applying revenue 
management. 
1
8 
Pan, 
Ratchfor
d, and 
Shankar 
(2002) 
Examine the 
possibility that 
observed price 
dispersion in 
electronic markets 
is due to 
differences in 
service offerings 
among e-tailers.  
Main research 
question is whether 
this substantial 
price dispersion 
can be explained 
by differences in 
services offered by 
e-tailers. 
Books, CDs, 
DVDs, 
computer 
software, and 
hardware  
Factor 
analysis, 
hedonic 
regressio
n 
analyses 
Price dispersion 
explained by 
heterogeneity in e-tailer 
services is small and that 
substantial amounts of 
price dispersion remain, 
even after correcting for 
the influence of e-tailer 
services.  This evidence 
is contrary to the 
hypothesis that search 
costs 
1
9 
Clemens, 
Hann, 
and Hitt 
(2002) 
Examine the 
presence of price 
dispersion and 
product 
differentiation.   
Airline tickets 
sold online 
Log-
linear 
regressio
n 
Price dispersion is still 
significant even after 
adjusting for product 
offering differentiation.    
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Hypothesized Model 
Model without Strategic 
Similarity 
Model without Multi-Market 
Contact 
 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Beta 
(β)  
Pr > ltl 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Beta 
(β) 
Pr > ltl 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Beta 
(β) 
Pr > ltl 
H1 
Multi-Market 
Contact 
0.149 0.252 0.0009 0.193 0.327 <0.0001 ----- ----- ----- 
H2 
Strategic 
Similarity 
-0.079 -0.438 <0.0001 ----- ----- ----- 0.035 0.197 <0.0001 
H3 
Market 
Concentration 
-0.052 -0.229 <0.0001 -0.029 -0.127 0.0006 -0.047 -0.209 <0.0001 
H4 Market Size -0.048 -0.066 <0.0001 -0.053 -0.073 <0.0001 -0.063 -0.087 <0.0001 
H5 Route Distance 0.032 0.161 <0.0001 0.033 0.164 <0.0001 0.034 0.172 <0.0001 
H6 Hub Airport -0.003 -0.031 0.0101 -0.004 -0.044 0.0002 -0.005 -0.054 <0.0001 
H7 MMC x STS 0.184 0.428 <0.0001 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
H8 MMC x HHI -0.384 -0.615 <0.0001 -0.236 -0.377 <0.0001 ----- ----- ----- 
H9 STS x HHI 0.067 0.340 <0.0001 ----- ----- ----- -0.044 -0.226 <0.0001 
Adjusted R2 0.248 0.242 0.234 
